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INTRODUCTION 
Mostly regarded as a cause célèbre among recent Supreme Court 
opinions, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes1 is simply a course correction 
in class action jurisprudence.  Residing at the core of the Dukes opinion 
is the Court’s growing disenchantment with the contemporary class 
action’s certification process, which relies heavily on statistical 
sampling.  The Dukes Court’s denial of class certification has been 
hailed as a game changer for class action litigation.2  Yet, one of the 
important rationales behind the Court’s decision to decertify the Dukes 
class has not yet been adequately dissected.3  In examining the 
evolution of statistical methodology within modern class actions, this 
Article establishes why Dukes readjusted this evolutionary contour.  
Originally designed to enhance collective public benefit4 and 
envisioned as a procedural accelerant for imparting maximum benefit to 
class members,5 today’s class action has mushroomed into an 
uncontrollable legal maneuvering.6  Despite periodic legislative 
 
1. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
2. Andrew Longstreth, Wal-Mart v. Dukes Shakes up Employment Class Actions, THOMSON 
REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/01_-_ 
January/Wal-Mart_v__Dukes_shakes_up_employment_class_actions/. 
3. Although viewed as a game-changer within contemporary discourse, I view the significance 
of Wal-Mart as an attempt by the Supreme Court to correct the trajectory of modern class action 
litigation.  To that objective, I examine an important, yet much less focused, area of class action 
litigation strategy: using statistical evidence in pattern and practice discrimination.  In doing so, 
this Article dissects two threads.  The first thread examines (both anecdotally and theoretically) 
the issue of offering statistical proof to minimize individual issues.  The second thread attempts to 
establish the fundamental disconnect between trial by formula and substantive due process.  
4. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 
29 CARDOZO LAW REV. 2517 (2008); Owen W. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21 (1996). 
5. See David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective 
Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 564–67 (1987) (promoting an utilitarian objective of class actions in 
seeking public welfare optimization through risk minimization). 
6. Here, I draw attention to the fact that, despite measures taken over the last decades to rein 
in class action litigation, courts have been generally sympathetic to plaintiffs’ right to bring class 
action lawsuits.  Legal strategies and innovations created along the way have also assisted in 
engaging the court systems, especially at the district court level.  See James D. Cox & Randall S. 
Thomas, Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since 
Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 894 (2005) (commenting that a corporation is more likely 
to face a securities class action lawsuit than a confrontation with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission on enforcement). 
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interventions, such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act7 and 
the Class Action Fairness Act,8 legal strategies for class actions have 
continuously evolved over the last three decades.  In this changing 
landscape for class certification, statistical sampling has taken primacy 
over due process.9  That is to say, judicial economy has overshadowed 
substantive law’s concerns.  The seduction of procedural efficiency has 
masked a mad rush to certify the greatest number of litigants possible,10 
while also generating profitable business for class action lawyers.11  
Against this historical backdrop, this Article intends to examine the 
context and genesis of statistical sampling procedures in class action 
litigation.12 
 
7. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)).  The PSLRA made substantive 
changes to various federal securities laws to prevent plaintiffs’ lawyers from abusing securities 
class actions.  See Enzo Incandela, Comment, Recourse under § 10(B) on Life Support: The 
Displacement of Liability and Private Securities Fraud Action after Janus v. First Derivative, 43 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 935, 945–49 (2012) (“[T]he PSLRA attempted to stem the escalation of suits 
brought by plaintiffs as an attempt to unearth fraud through discovery, which would, in turn, lead 
to settlement.  One of the most important legal changes to come from the PSLRA was the 
heightening of pleading requirements.”). 
8. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)).  In part, Congress enacted the CAFA to 
reduce the ability to bring class action lawsuits.  See generally Danielle Kie Hart, Contract 
Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 175, 213 n.213 (2009).   
9. In the absence of a definitive “bright line” ruling by higher federal courts, lower courts have 
resorted to statistically based determinations of discrimination to establish the causal impact of 
plaintiffs’ injuries.  This Article shines the spotlight on this misguided overreliance.  
10. See Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REV. 429, 429 (1986) 
(“These mass tort claims have a number of similarities: they result in the filing of many suits; 
they produce high litigation costs; they are generally resolved only after great delay; they affect 
not only the litigants but other users of the court system; and their total human and economic 
costs affect all of society.”). 
11. See Richard B. Schmitt, Leaky System: Suits over Plastic Pipe Finally Bring Relief, 
Especially for Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1995, at A1; BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS 
E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE 
FOR JUDGES 22 (2005) (“In ‘mega’ cases, be prepared to see attorney requests for truly huge 
amounts, up to hundreds of millions of dollars.”). 
12. In part, this Article contends that courts have for too long been lenient in accepting 
statistical proof in deciding pattern and practice discrimination cases.  In other words, courts are 
all-too frequently accepting marginal statistical evidence to draw inferences of discriminatory 
behavior based on inadequate or erroneous sampling.  See Richard A. Nagareda, Class 
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 101 (2009) (“[T]he 
flashpoints today over class certification concern the role of aggregate proof of a statistical or 
economic nature.”).  See also In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 244 F.R.D. 89, 111 
(D. Mass. 2009) (noting that plaintiffs in a pharmaceutical marketing class action offered 
evidence based on statistical sampling to show that a marketing campaign caused an increase in 
off-label drug prescriptions); In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 
484, 488 (D. N.J. 2000) (explaining that plaintiffs in a products liability class action offered 
evidence based on statistical sampling to show that cars’ propensity to catch fire should constitute 
definitive proof of common causation). 
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It is generally accepted that class actions present an effective and 
efficient mechanism for courts to adjudicate a large volume of injury 
claims from a large number of plaintiffs.13  Thus, class action litigation 
can be an efficient and accelerated means to handle claims of pattern or 
practice discrimination.  The key to a class action is to effectively bind 
such litigants.14  Therefore, class action litigation is about aggregating 
and combining numerous and common individual circumstances.  Class 
actions proceed through a certification process that attempts to bind the 
plaintiffs by extracting their inherent commonality. 
Finding appropriate commonality among litigants requires the 
identification of a single claim or set of claims that may cohesively 
combine litigants’ judicial aspirations, as opposed to a set of loosely 
coupled individual aspirations. Therefore, before a class action trial may 
begin, the judge must ensure that there exists cohesion and commonality 
among the various class members.15  However, since efficiency is at the 
core of class actions, a judge cannot go through an exhaustive analysis 
of each plaintiff’s allegations. Instead, the determination of 
commonality involves selecting a representative subset from the larger 
class and ensuring that the subset is an adequate representation of the 
class.  Commonality is established via statistics—a widely accepted, 
and at times loosely implemented, methodology in modern class action 
litigation.  This Article calls for a re-examination of the process of 
finding, and practice of showing, commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Class action litigation in the twenty-first century is big business,16  
and the growing needs of a commerce-driven enterprise allowed 
procedural economy to overshadow substantive law.  Deviating from its 
original goal of furthering collective public benefit,17 contemporary 
class action litigation has ushered in an exponential growth of 
litigants—in part, as this Article contends, because of statistical 
 
13. See Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of 
Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 619–21 (1993) (arguing for statistical methodology as a 
tool to enhance the efficiency of aggregate litigation and to maximize participation from all 
willing parties). 
14. Id. 
15. See generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038985. 
16. See Schmitt, supra note 11 (examining a trend in class action litigation that often times 
may be driven more by plaintiffs’ lawyers’ financial interests than those of the plaintiffs).  See 
also U.S. SEN. ARLEN SPECTOR, THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005, S. REP. NO. 109-
14, at 14–20 (2005) (explaining how attorneys receive excessive fees, but that class members 
receive little or no recovery). 
17. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 20–22 (discussing how judicial blackmail forces settlements of 
frivolous cases). 
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modeling.18  This focus on judicial efficiency has often come at the 
expense of liberty and equality—the core principles of due process.19  
This Article uses the Dukes decision as a lens to examine the 
relationship between commonality and statistical sampling within the 
context of class action litigation. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of Dukes.  Next, Part 
II traces the evolutionary path of statistical methodology in modern 
class action litigation, while deriving linkages between commonality 
and statistical sampling.  Part III then delves into the core of statistical 
deviations to better understand how plaintiffs provide evidence of 
discrimination through statistical sampling.  This Part sets the stage for 
Part IV, which evaluates the due process concerns implicated by 
statistical methodologies. Here, this Article explores in detail two 
distinct phenomena in class actions: the use of statistical extrapolation 
to develop a foundational understanding of how sampling may hinder 
the due process rights of an individual litigant, and the interplay 
between liberty, equality, and judicial economy.  The Article concludes 
by reiterating that the Supreme Court’s holding in Dukes is merely a 
course correction to counter the unbridled use of statistics in class action 
litigation. 
I. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF WAL-MART STORES, INC. V. DUKES 
Some observations of the Dukes Court’s findings will help set the 
 
18. Id. at 20–21 (“[S]tate court judges often are inclined to certify cases for class action 
treatment not because they believe a class trial would be more efficient than an individual trial, 
but because they believe class certification will simply induce the defendant to settle the case 
without trial.”). 
19. Liberty within the context of civil litigation means that every individual should have his or 
her day in court.  See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
4449, at 417 (1st ed. 1981).  While the concept of liberty has remained fundamentally the same, 
the doctrine of equality has taken various shades in its application within differing contexts.  
Fundamentally, equality is premised upon ensuring that similar scenarios produce similar 
outcomes.  See William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory 
of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 711 (2006).  Yet, equality is often 
viewed within a narrower prism.  See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil 
Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1865–67 (2002) (explaining the various implications of 
equality and noting how scholarship often times espouses a narrower view of equality).  Equality 
is also seen through the prism of outcome consistency and linked with the liberty doctrine.  See 
Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749–50 (2011) (viewing 
equality and liberty as interconnected).  There remains, however, some tension between the “day 
in court” ideals of liberty and “equal treatment” conceptions of equality.  See JACK B. 
WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, 
CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 127 (1995) (showing how aggregation 
cuts against common law’s ability for individual justice against injury).  See also Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846–47 (1999) (noting the “inherent tension” between class 
representation and the “day-in-court” concept). 
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stage before delving into the mechanics of class certification using 
statistical sampling.  In Dukes, the Supreme Court overturned class 
certification for 1.5 million current and former female Wal-Mart 
employees who alleged systemic gender discrimination in pay and 
promotion opportunities.20  By contending that pay and promotion 
decisions were based on the subjective discretion of individual 
managers, the plaintiffs sought compensation for Wal-Mart’s pattern 
and practice of discrimination.21  A few observations are relevant to this 
Article.  First, a 5-4 majority was not swayed by the statistical sampling 
used by plaintiffs to draw an inference of class-wide discrimination.22  
Specifically, the Court found that the class did not meet the threshold 
requirement of commonality under Rule 23(a)(2).23  More importantly, 
the Court narrowed the threshold requirement of commonality for 
certification by making clear that applicable common characteristics 
should be capable of resolving a class-wide question of law or fact.24 
One goal of class certification is to select a set of class 
representatives from a large universe of plaintiffs seeking judicial 
adjudication of their grievances.  The process of representation relies on 
 
20. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2010).  See also Plaintiffs’ 
Third Amended Complaint at 3–9, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2002 WL 33645690 (N.D. 
Cal. 2001) (No. C01-2252 MJJ) (denoting the plaintiffs’ allegations of discrimination against 
Wal-Mart). 
21. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 578. 
22. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2549–53 (2011).  The Court then 
denied class certification under Rule 23(b)(2).  See id. at 2557–61. 
23. See id. at 2556–57 (“Because respondents provide no convincing proof of a companywide 
discriminatory pay and promotion policy, we have concluded that they have not established the 
existence of any common question.”). 
24. Id. at 2550–51.  The plaintiffs in the case sought to interpret commonality based on 
identifying questions applicable to the entire class, but the Court interpreted commonality to yield 
common answers, not just questions that are common to the entire class.  For example, “Has Wal-
Mart discriminated against women?” is a common question, but it may not yield common 
answers; some store managers in some locations may have discriminated against some women 
under certain circumstances, but other managers in different locations may have treated women 
neutrally.  Therefore, the Court held that any common element “must depend upon a common 
contention.”  Id. at 2551.  This ruling means that if the plaintiffs had all shared the same 
supervisor, they could argue that evidence of particular management practices would be common 
to the group.  Indeed, the Court observed that it would be far less likely, in a company as broad 
and diverse as Wal-Mart, that all managers would discriminate against women.  See id. at 2554 
(“[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any corporation—and surely most managers in a 
corporation that forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria 
for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.”).  Thus, the Court 
emphasized that commonality should be viewed as “capable of class-wide resolution which 
means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of 
each one of the claims in one stroke.”  Id. at 2551.  This sentiment has been echoed at the lower 
court level.  See Gaston v. Exelon Corp., 247 F.R.D. 75, 82 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“Plaintiffs could 
simply propose the question ‘has employer discriminated against class members’ and always 
meet the commonality requirement.  Obviously, something more is necessary.”).  
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finding a central element among the class members.  Conceptually, this 
central element must be so pervasive among the class that identifying 
this characteristic would eliminate the need for an examination of all 
individual members.25  Thus, identification of commonality is the crux 
of class litigation—the glue that binds a large conglomeration of 
particularized instances.26  In articulating its vision for the future of 
class action lawsuits, the Court in Dukes departed from its common 
question centric paradigm and articulated a more stringent standard 
under Rule 23 that focuses on responses to a common question.27  This 
newly minted test must not be seen as an insurmountable hurdle for 
access to justice against discrimination in class action litigation, but 
rather as a fundamental course correction by the Court. 
Proving class-wide discrimination has long been commandeered by 
statistics.  Imagine if almost all of the 1.5 million Dukes litigants sought 
their day in court to adjudicate their individual claims of discrimination 
against Wal-Mart. Such an undertaking would surely be unfeasible.  
The most fundamental challenge to aggregating class claims, however, 
is to find the pathway for determining cohesion among a multitude of 
scenarios—i.e., meeting the commonality threshold.28 While its 
 
25. Emphasizing that aggregating cases without common questions of fact or law is not what 
is intended for class action litigation.  Establishing commonality is intended to bind the disparate 
cases into a cohesive unit for trial.  See infra Part II.A. 
26. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 (“Here respondents wish to sue about literally millions of 
employment decisions at once.  Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those 
decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ claims 
for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.”). 
27. Id. at 2558–59. 
28. This Article examines commonality within the context of how its contour has evolved 
from pre- to post-Dukes.  The commonality requirement is one of the controlling characteristics 
of class action litigation that is utilized for certifying a plaintiff class.  Prior to Dukes, courts 
either relaxed the commonality requirement by giving primacy to predominance or merged 
commonality with Rule 23(a)(3) typicality.  In either instance, courts’ normal rationale was 
animated by the predominance requirement that “questions of law or fact common to the class . . . 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) 
(requiring “questions of law or fact common to the class”).  Before Dukes, courts generally held a 
liberal bias in finding a question of law or fact for the purpose of class certification.  See, e.g., 
Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting the easier burden placed 
on satisfying the commonality requirement for class certification).  Furthermore, courts 
maintained that the threshold for meeting commonality is not high and that Rule 23(a)(2) should 
be liberally construed.  See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(low threshold); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 1975) (liberal 
construction), vacated by Detroit Edison Co. v. EEOC, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).  In Dukes, however, 
the Court conceptualized a higher threshold for commonality, perhaps in response to relaxed 
certification standards in lower federal courts.  See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (“Merely showing 
that Wal-Mart’s policy of discretion has produced an overall sex-based disparity does not 
suffice.”).  The complexity in interpreting commonality comes from the tension between 
commonality and predominance under Rule 23(b)(3)—wherever Rule 23(b)(3) is applicable, it 
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existence is theoretically elegant, establishing proof of commonality 
across a large number of particularized instances is conceptually 
difficult.  In practice, statistical reasoning has been used to establish 
commonality across a large universe.29 
The Dukes plaintiffs attempted to reinvent class certification and 
flout due process through statistical elegance.  The Supreme Court 
appropriately intervened to repudiate class certification in Dukes.  This 
Article contextualizes Dukes to examine how statistical modeling in 
recent class actions has diluted its applicability in drawing inferences of 
pattern or practice discrimination based on qualitative and probabilistic 
outcomes. 
II. STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY AND GROSS DISPARITIES                            
OF DISCRIMINATION 
The search for procedural efficiency in adjudication gave birth to 
class action litigation.30  Efficiency cultivated the need for litigants to 
identify common characteristics among class members, and statistical 
determination became the key to establishing commonality in 
contemporary class action litigation.31 Thus, the Dukes Court’s 
difficulty in allowing class certification based on statistical evidence 
must be viewed through various complexities.  First, in imposing a 
heightened burden for determining commonality, the Court internalized 
 
requires that common issues must predominate over individual issues.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  
While the implication is quite transparent, litigants (and judges) often conflate predominance with 
commonality.   
29. See Nagareda, supra note 12, at 152–57 (observing, but criticizing, the role of statistical 
methodology in class certification proceedings).  See also Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, 
Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass 
Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 827 (1992) (arguing that statistical sampling provides an enhanced 
quality of justice in mass litigation in comparison with trying on a case-by-case basis); Laurens 
Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545, 567 (1998) (arguing in 
favor of using statistical surveys to aid in injury determinations); Laurens Walker & John 
Monahan, Sampling Evidence at the Crossroads, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 969, 988 (2007) (extolling 
the virtues of random sampling for determining facts in aggregate litigation). 
30. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 38.2 (3d ed. 1995). 
31. One scholar emphasized the significance of commonality and the difficulty in extracting 
commonality among a large conglomeration of litigants, noting,  
Equity Rule 38 was probably the most straightforward of all the rules adopted to date 
to provide for class or representative actions, stating simply, “When the question is one 
of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to 
make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or 
defend for the whole.”  For about 25 years, this language provided the basis for class 
actions in federal courts.  Representative actions could also be brought in many state 
courts under various state court rules.   
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR 
PRIVATE GAIN 10–11 (2000). 
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the difficulty in simply connecting statistical sampling with finding 
commonality.  Second, observing the district court’s determination of 
discrimination within the subjective and localized process of corporate 
decision making, the Court recognized the need to re-examine the 
existing practice.32 Third, unbridled use of statistics in class 
certifications, in response to the purported goal of judicial economy, 
calls for a renewed discussion of class certification through the prism of 
conflict between liberty and equality.33  The liberty principle recognizes 
that all class members are entitled to their day in court, whether through 
individualized adjudication or within an aggregated mechanism,34 while 
the equality principle ensures that like circumstances follow like 
outcomes.35 
A. Commonality and Its Intricate Relationship with Sampling 
To better understand why the Supreme Court rearranged the Rule 23 
commonality prerequisite, this Part looks at how lower courts certify 
class action lawsuits.36 
The class action is  
a non-traditional litigation procedure permitting a representative with 
typical claims to . . . stand in judgment for . . . a class of similarly 
situated persons. . . .  The purpose and intent of class action[s] . . . is to 
adjudicate and obtain res judicata effect on all common issues 
applicable not only to the representatives . . . but to all others who are 
“similarly situated” . . . .37 
Class actions permit either a single individual or a handful of 
individuals to represent members of the entire class and adjudicate a 
series of injury claims within a single trial.  Before the trial can proceed 
to the causation and injury determination stages, the court must 
determine whether the representative individual or smaller set of 
individuals can be an adequate proxy to represent the other members of 
the class.  As discussed below, class certification before trial is based on 
four threshold requirements enshrined in Rule 23(a).38  In addition to 
 
32. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2558–59. 
33. Id. 
34. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, at 416–18 (extolling the virtues of liberty as a historic 
tradition and affirming that every individual should have access to justice in some form). 
35. See Yoshino, supra note 19, at 748–50 (examining many variants of equality, especially 
its interrelationship with liberty). 
36. The four requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) are numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (explaining 
the requirements in detail). 
37. Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 703 So. 2d 542, 544 (La. 1997) (internal citation 
omitted). 
38. See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text (noting the requirements for class 
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these four prerequisites, a federal class action must fall under one of the 
three categories articulated in Rule 23(b).39   
Rule 23(a) tests the cohesiveness of the class. Cohesiveness is crucial 
because class litigation entails aggregating a series of individual claims 
in a single process, such that its outcome comports with the aspirations 
of all individual outcomes.  Here, connectivity is vital to the integrity of 
the process, as aggregation requires binding the diverse plaintiffs into a 
common thread of unified aspirations.40  Cohesion between these 
plaintiffs must therefore be carefully measured.  In other words, 
certification is necessary to ensure that the result of class litigation 
would reasonably reflect the outcomes if all members of the class 
litigated their claims individually.   
Under Rule 23(a), a judge must first evaluate whether there is a 
sufficient number of plaintiffs to justify a class.41  Second, there must 
 
certification). 
39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).  Rule 23(b) can be explained as follows: 
Rule 23(b) lays out three additional categories for class actions.  A plaintiff may bring 
a class action under Rule 23(b)(1) if she can show that winning her lawsuit would 
necessarily mean that some other potential plaintiff would have to lose an identical 
lawsuit.  This happens in one of two circumstances: either the rights the plaintiff seeks 
to enforce would require not enforcing someone else’s rights or the plaintiff seeks a 
money award from a limited fund, so paying one plaintiff the full amount she deserves 
necessarily means not paying others.  Rule 23(b)(2) covers cases where a plaintiff 
seeks some form of declaratory or injunctive relief.  And Rule 23(b)(3) addresses cases 
in which a plaintiff seeks monetary relief; it requires a plaintiff to show that (1) 
common issues do not just exist but predominate over more individual issues and (2) 
the class action is superior to other methods of resolving the controversy.  Rule 
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes are known as “mandatory” classes: if a court certifies them, 
all class members are involved whether they like it or not.  Rule 23(b)(3) classes are 
known as “opt-out” classes because individual class members may choose not to 
participate in the lawsuit and not to be bound by its verdict. 
Andrew John Trask, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Class Actions and Legal Strategy, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 319, 322–23.   
40. See id. at 322 (“[Rule 23(a)] is designed to test whether a proposed class action is cohesive 
enough to justify a massive trial culminating in a one-size-fits-all verdict.”). 
41. Numerosity is defined in Rule 23(a)(1) as “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or 
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if (1) the class is so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).  While the criterion conveys 
the idea of having a multitude of plaintiffs for meeting the definition of a class, there seems to 
divergence among the courts in deciding what number satisfies the numerosity threshold.  Rule 
23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement has been a moving target for courts, and plaintiffs’ lawyers 
have taken advantage of the indiscriminate standard by maximizing the number of plaintiffs 
joined in a class.  As a result, courts have steadily adjusted the numerosity threshold upward.  
See, e.g., Dale Elecs. v. R.C.L. Elecs., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 534 (D.N.H. 1971) (finding that 
thirteen class members achieved numerosity); Rosario v. Cook Cnty., 101 F.R.D. 659, 661 (N.D. 
Ill. 1983) (finding that twenty class members satisfied the numerosity requirement for class 
certification); Esler v. Northrop Corp., 86 F.R.D. 20, 34 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (finding that forty class 
members met the numerosity threshold); Burkhart-Deal v. CitiFinancial, Inc., No. 8-1289, 2010 
WL 457122, at *2–3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2010) (rejecting certification for a class consisting of 
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be a common issue or criterion that binds all members of the class.42  
Third, the specific plaintiff in question must be a typical representative 
of the other members of the class.43  Fourth, the class representative(s) 
must be capable of adequately protecting the interests of the larger class 
without substantively jeopardizing her own interests.44 
As the impact of Dukes continues to unfold, the Court’s rulemaking 
on class certification must be reviewed within the context of its 
commonality jurisprudence.  With its objective of judicial economy, the 
Court’s commonality jurisprudence began in General Telephone Co. of 
the Southwest v. Falcon.45  Animated by a more liberal interpretation of 
what binds a class, the Falcon Court seemingly merged Rule 23(a)(2) 
commonality and Rule 23(a)(3) typicality to ensure that the 
representative plaintiffs and class plaintiffs had interrelated claims.46  
Following this lead, lower courts liberally construed Rule 23 class 
certification requirements, especially commonality.47  By imposing on 
representative plaintiffs a burden that “is easily met,”48 and with a 
 
approximately 700 employees that did not meet the numerosity requirement).  The stricter 
numerosity requirement is perhaps an indication of why the size of classes has expanded over the 
last few decades.  In general, meeting the threshold depends on facts and circumstances of the 
case at hand, not on any particular number of plaintiffs. 
42. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550–51 (2011) (“The crux of this 
case is commonality—the rule requiring a plaintiff to show that ‘there are questions of law or 
fact common to the class.’”  (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2))). 
43. Typicality represents more of a heightened evidentiary burden that courts have imposed 
under Rule 23(a).  Professor Klonoff has provided an excellent commentary on typicality: 
“[S]ome courts have made it more difficult to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement.  In 
most instances, however, the same reasoning would lead to an identical outcome under 
commonality ((a)(2)), adequacy ((a)(4)), or predominance ((b)(3)) . . . .”).  Klonoff, supra note 
15, at 19 n.92. 
44. Adequacy is more of a new import that attempts to interject elements of due process in 
class action litigation.  See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (“[T]he 
Due Process Clause of course requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent 
the interests of the absent class members.”); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940) 
(explaining that the Due Process Clause implies class members must “in fact [be] adequately 
represented by the parties who are present”).  As such, Rule 23(a)(4) was amended in 2003 to add 
more teeth to the procedural constraints in plaintiffs’ ability to bring class action lawsuits.  As 
explained in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 amendments, “This subdivision 
recognizes the importance of class counsel, states the obligation to represent the interests of the 
class, and provides a framework for selection of class counsel.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory 
committee notes (2003).  Some scholars, however, expressed reservations to the 2003 Rule 23 
amendments.  See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff, The Judiciary’s Flawed Application of Rule 23’s 
“Adequacy of Representation” Requirement, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 671; Bruce Braverman, The 
‘Adequate Representative’ Requirement Gains Some Teeth, 12 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 945 
(2011).   
45. 457 U.S. 147 (1982) 
46. Id. at 157 n.13. 
47. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 311(6th Cir. 1975). 
48. Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994).   
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threshold that “is not high,”49 courts simply required classes to identify 
common legal or factual questions among its members. 
Falcon was about guiding class action litigation through a definitive 
trajectory.  Following Falcon, commonality emerged as a definitional 
paradigm used to index the trajectory of future litigation.  The Court 
observed that a class may be certified only if “there are questions of law 
or fact common to the class.”50  Thus, Falcon opened class action 
litigation to innovative lawyering and liberal judicial decision making—
resulting in an era in which plaintiffs predominantly used statistical 
sampling to fulfill Rule 23’s commonality requirement.  This approach 
opened the class action flood gates, allowing both plaintiffs and 
defendants to present a plethora of statistical evidence to support and 
oppose class treatment.51  The Dukes Court recognized this issue and 
thus tightened commonality’s unbridled trajectory.  In observing the 
possibility of disparate questions driving individual class members’ 
claims and denying class certification, the Court diverged from 
Falcon’s liberal construction of commonality.   
Lower courts’ permissive stance on the use of statistical sampling 
convinced the Dukes Court that it is no longer sufficient to certify a 
class based on a common question, but rather the question must be 
essential to the outcome of the case.52  One must ask whether the Court 
raised the bar on aspiring class action plaintiffs or merely retrenched an 
unduly expanding trajectory.  To adequately answer this question, this 
Article reviews the fundamental relationship between statistical 
sampling and Rule 23’s commonality requirement. 
Before delving into statistics, it is important to observe that even if a 
class passes muster under Rule 23(a), it must still meet one of the three 
provisions of Rule 23(b).  For example, plaintiffs may seek declaratory 
or injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2), so long as the relief sought is 
superior to other available forms of resolution.53 Moreover, Rule 
23(b)(3) envisions scenarios in which plaintiffs seek monetary relief, 
where common issues predominate over individualized issues, and 
where the class action device is deemed superior to other dispute 
resolution methods.54  A plaintiff may also bring a class action under 
 
49. Jenkins v. Raymark, 782 F. 2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986). 
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
51. 131 S. Ct. at 2546–50. 
52. Id. at 2551. 
53. Id. at 323. 
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  Today, most class actions are certified under Rule 23(b)(3); in 
recent years, however, courts have made it far more difficult to certify class actions under (b)(3) 
by summarily finding, after identifying significant individualized issues, that predominance 
cannot be satisfied.  See Klonoff, supra note 15, at 68. 
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Rule 23(b)(1) when the possibility of victory for such plaintiff would 
preclude other plaintiffs from being victorious based on a probabilistic 
evaluation of winning an identical lawsuit.55  In such a situation, where 
there are limited funds, the procedure can be seen as a safeguard, 
preventing the automatic trigger of an avalanche of copycat plaintiff 
lawsuits on account of paying a particular plaintiff.  
A detailed analysis of Rule 23 procedure is beyond the scope of this 
Article. This short discussion of Rule 23(b) merely highlights that 
certain class action certification provisions retain elements of 
substantive due process.  Second, all of these requirements emphasize 
commonality—the single most important characteristics of class 
actions.  Despite this strong undercurrent of substantive law, procedural 
developments and the desire for efficiency in class action jurisprudence 
may have attenuated due process, a phenomenon discussed later in this 
Article. 
B. Tracing the Roots from Commonality to Statistical Significance 
Keeping the stated premise of efficiency at the forefront, statistical 
sampling has transformed from a fashionable innovation into a reliable 
staple for class action litigation.56  Two primary factors assisted in this 
transformation.  First, the exponential growth of computational speed 
and computing storage capability has allowed for extensive and 
effortless data manipulation.57  Second, in emphasizing efficiency over 
strict rule application, district courts allowed the temptation of using 
statistical sampling as a single proxy for multiple trials to take root.58   
Statistical sampling in class actions comes from the following 
conceptualization.  If an adequately constructed subset from a larger 
universe of data can be associated with a causal event, and if it is 
deemed statistically significant, then the results of such observation can 
be extrapolated across an entire universe.59  While judicial adjudication 
 
55. See Trask, supra note 39, at 322; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). 
56. See infra note 59.  
57. Enhancement in computer storage and speed has allowed ease and abundance in data 
manipulation.  Observing this, an expert in data management noted, “The amount of data going 
through the Internet is so mind-boggling that it deals in numbers that most people are unfamiliar 
with.  According to Cisco, which released its annual Visual Networking Index last week, traffic 
will reach 966 exabytes by 2015.”  Carl Weinschenk, Cisco VNI: The Long Data Explosion 
Continues, ITBUSINESSEDGE (June 7, 2011), http://www.itbusinessedge.com/cm/community/ 
features/interviews/blog/cisco-vni-the-long-data-explosion-continues/?cs=47284. 
58. See Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?, supra note 19, at 710–11 (noting the positive 
aspects of statistical sampling, such as achieving both judicial economy and process efficiency). 
59. The idea of extrapolation is based on a fundamental assumption that the causation 
associated with any plaintiff or a random sample does not vary within the population for which 
the sample in question is a part.  In other words, causation applied to an individual does not 
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using data analysis is as old as the history of litigation itself, the 
Supreme Court’s use of statistical analysis to determine pattern or 
practice discrimination in class actions began in Castaneda v. Partida.60  
Decided in 1977, Castaneda for the first time introduced statistical 
evidence to aid in “bringing a proof convincingly to life.”61  By 
concluding that a pattern and practice of discrimination existed based on 
data showing an underrepresentation of an ethnic group among persons 
selected for grand jury duties, the Court opened a new vista where a 
“gross statistical disparity” became reliable evidence of discriminatory 
practices.62 
The Court later utilized the same analytical test in Hazelwood School 
 
change or vary from individual to individual.  Therefore, extrapolation would satisfy the needs of 
justice for all such individuals once we identify a representative sample set.  See Bone, Statistical 
Adjudication, supra note 13, at 573–76; Victoria Branton, A Case for the Jury?: Seventh 
Amendment Rights in Asbestos Litigation, 3 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 231, 244–45 (1998) (arguing 
that “case aggregation” does not violate the Seventh Amendment).  See also Manuel L. Real, 
What Evil Have We Wrought: Class Action, Mass Torts, and Settlement, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
437, 446–49 (1998) (arguing for judicial economy in mass tort cases); Walker & Monahan, 
Sampling Damages, supra note 29, at 546 (arguing in favor of random sampling to help in 
adjudicating a large conglomeration of individual tort cases); Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort 
Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause, 83 IOWA L. REV. 499, 502 (1998) 
(arguing why combing trials would not violate the Seventh Amendment).  Some district courts 
have strongly advocated that aggregative litigation fulfills due process requirements.  See Saks & 
Blanck, supra note 29, at 827. 
60. 430 U.S. 482 (1977). 
61. In Castaneda, the Supreme Court ushered in the era of using statistics as an aid to 
anecdotal evidence to prove discrimination.  See id. at 495–98.  See also Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (“The company’s principal response to this evidence is 
that statistics can never, in and of themselves, prove the existence of a pattern or practice of 
discrimination, or even establish a prima facie case shifting to the employer the burden of 
rebutting the inference raised by the figures.  But, as even our brief summary of the evidence 
shows, this was not a case in which the Government relied on ‘statistics alone.’  The individuals 
who testified about their personal experiences with the company brought the cold numbers 
convincingly to life.”).  
62. The standard of proof courts began to use in the aftermath of Castaneda may have 
suffered from erroneous understandings and faulty assumptions.  While the Castaneda Court’s 
reference to disparities of more than two or three standard deviations was just a “rough” 
methodology of dealing with statistical significance, courts now apply the standard en masse in 
discrimination cases, without adequate interpretation of levels of statistical significance, raising 
difficult legal and statistical questions.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 
F.2d 633, 647 (4th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. United Va. Bank, 615 F.2d 147, 152 (4th Cir. 1980); 
Cormier v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 211, 250–51 (W.D. La. 1981).  Yet, the Castaneda 
Court neither reached nor decided a floor of minimum standard deviation to support a particular 
statistical significance, as reflected in the opinion’s footnotes.  See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 496 
n.17.  As some courts in later years began using three standard deviations as an upper bound of 
standard deviation, while using strong qualitative terms like “gross disparities,” the judicial 
system entered an era of confusion coupled with an unsophisticated use of statistics.  See, e.g., 
Movement for Opportunity and Equal. v. Gen. Motors, 622 F.2d 1235, 1259 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(observing how courts at times have taken liberty in applying various ranges of standard 
deviations for statistical significance).   
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District v. United States63 to determine whether a school district 
practiced race-based employment discrimination.64  In Hazelwood, the 
plaintiffs brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
alleging that African-Americans had been unfairly discriminated against 
in the district’s hiring decisions.65 The plaintiffs used statistical 
evidence to show that the number of African-Americans hired was not 
proportional to their representation in the available labor pool.66  
Applying Castaneda’s statistical test to the labor market in question, the 
Court noted that the divergence between actual and expected 
representations of American-Americans in the school district could be 
explained by chance alone.67 
Both Castaneda and Hazelwood attempted to draw inferences based 
on statistical models that compare expected results from a neutral 
system and observed results from a discrimination-laden system.  
Although neither Castaneda nor Hazelwood considered these statistical 
tests as bright line rules to prove discrimination,68 a subsequent three 
decades of lower court decisions tells a story of reliance on statistical 
evidence by class plaintiffs to prove widespread discrimination.69 
Extensive use of statistical evidence in lower courts is an interesting 
phenomenon.  While for decades plaintiffs have adopted its use to prove 
commonality, the tendency of courts to readily allow statistical evidence 
is somewhat surprising, especially given that the Supreme Court has 
neither put forward any specific bright line statistical threshold nor 
spelled out the various assumptions upon which the model produces 
error-free results.70  Judicial overreliance on drawing inferences of a 
 
63. 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
64. Id. at 307–08. 
65. Id. at 301. 
66. Id. at 303. 
67. Id. at 311 n.17. 
68. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 482, 496–97 n.17 (1977); Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 
311 n.17. 
69. See cases cited supra, note 62. 
70. First, the idea for the Castaneda Court’s standard deviations test originated from the 
statistical interpretation that three standard deviations corresponded to a level of statistical 
significance of about 0.3%.  Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 496 n.17.  Yet, use of this methodology is 
neither supported by the Supreme Court’s language in Castaneda, nor derived from literature 
from standard social science practice.  A significance level below 1% immediately adduces the 
statistical test a heightened level of significance, albeit with some other mathematical rancor.  The 
relationship between standard deviations and statistical significance bears the additional 
assumption that the data population at issue is normally distributed, which can be a function of 
both the size and quality of the data.  Equally important, venturing into the innovative world of 
probabilistic quantification certainly invites due process concerns; even if we use the highest 
possible statistical significance (e.g., 0.3% corresponding to three standard deviations), the legal 
assumption that must accompany it is that the corresponding defendant would be able to confront 
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pattern and practice of discrimination using statistical modeling 
following Castaneda and Hazelwood seems to be based on incorrect 
assumptions.71  In any case, the standard framework of statistical testing 
utilized in today’s class action litigation draws its origin from the 
binomial model introduced in Castaneda and subsequently applied in 
Hazelwood.72   
The Supreme Court’s general framework of statistical methodology 
for pattern or practice of discrimination can be seen as a two-part 
analytical framework (with certain exceptions):73 the first part reveals 
features of the statistical sample and the second part creates a rule of 
thumb for interpreting the results of the statistical test.74  Furthermore, 
sampling has specific assumptions.  First, the representative sample 
must be based on a randomly selected subset from the universal 
population, where the representative sample must have all the 
characteristics of the universe.75  Second, such a sample must contain a 
fixed probability of occurrence of the desired characteristic being tested.  
Third, the desired characteristic must occur within a binary of two 
possible outcomes—presence or absence of the trait.76  Fourth, the 
representative sample must be constructed based on an independent 
drawing for each test.  In each drawing, the outcome of prior drawings 
does not affect the probability of selecting the characteristic in 
 
and refute such statistical evidence.  On a close examination, however, it is clear that, unless it is 
allowed to confront each component of the sample (a conglomeration of representative sample of 
plaintiffs in this scenario), the defendant has no ability to offer proof against such statistical 
probability.  As a result, the two or three standard deviations test fails to take into consideration 
all accompanied assumptions and evidence. 
71. For an elegant (and rather simple) explanation of the Castaneda Court’s binomial model, 
see Thomas J. Sugrue & William B. Fairley, A Case of Unexamined Assumptions: The Use and 
Misuse of the Statistical Analysis of Castaneda/Hazelwood in Discrimination Litigation, 24 B.C. 
L. REV. 925, 929–30 (1983).  
72. In Castaneda, applying a binomial model revolved around the determinations of n, the 
sample size, and p, the observed level of significance.  430 U.S. at 496 n.17.  While identification 
of these two parameters is vitally important in binomial analysis, they are easier to manipulate in 
simple chance-dependent events, such as rolling a dice or tossing a coin.  On the other hand, 
application of a binomial model to identify discrimination in litigation involves nuanced 
statistical modeling and analysis.  The conceptual difficulty in transferring statistical knowledge 
in legal reasoning is both complex and at times non-deterministic.  The Supreme Court had to 
make assumptions in selecting parameters n and p for an application of binomial modeling in 
Hazelwood,  433 U.S. at 309–10.  
73. See Sugrue & Fairley, supra note 71, at 936–47 (discussing the various assumptions 
underlying the binomial model). 
74. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 497–99. 
75. See supra note 59 (discussing how extrapolation serves the interests of justice when 
applied correctly). 
76. See Sugrue and Fairley, supra note 71, at 935–37 (describing the binomial model as 
“simple” and “useful”). 
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question.77 
Courts must take great care in interpreting results of statistical tests 
used by class action litigants.  Sample size and statistical significance 
both impact test results.  Therefore, interpretations of where statistical 
outcomes fall become fundamentally dependent on these important 
benchmarks for a number of reasons.  First, the representative sample 
must be large enough to produce statistically significant results.  
Second, although the Court has articulated a threshold number of 
standard deviations required to show discriminatory behavior, such 
threshold must be viewed on a case-by-case basis.  For example, the 
Castaneda Court observed a general rule that “for such large samples, if 
the difference between the expected value and the observed number is 
greater than two or three standard deviations, then the hypothesis that 
jury drawing was random would be suspect to a social scientist.”78 
Often in class action litigation, the relationship between sample size 
and statistically significant standard deviations has not been researched 
adequately and evaluated carefully.79  At times, the data distribution of 
 
77. Id. at 929. 
78. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 496 n.17. 
79. The general propensity within standard pattern and practice discrimination class actions is 
to analyze statistics based on the methodology inherited from Castaneda/Hazelwood.  In doing 
so, many courts fail to take into consideration variations in sample size and fail to appropriately 
connect sample size with statistical significance for extracting proof of discrimination.  For 
example, when dealing with a small sample size, a small calculated disparity in that sample might 
be treated differently than a different, larger sample size.  Therefore, for the purpose of 
comparing statistically significant discriminatory behavior within a particular field, courts should 
strive to analyze similar sample sizes to achieve consistent legal outcomes.  In the absence of 
such consistency in sample size, the observed levels of disparities should be legally treated in 
accordance with the corresponding significance.  Similarly, if we are to increase the sample size 
for the purpose of statistical testing in the same experiment, the same observed small disparity 
would then be viewed with a heightened statistical significance, resulting in a different conclusion 
than when the sample size was smaller.  Other scholars have corroborated this view.  See Stephen 
E. Fienberg, Samuel H. Krislov & Miron L. Straf, Understanding and Evaluating Statistical 
Evidence in Litigation, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 23 (1995) (“A nondiscriminatory practice that 
produced a very small difference in the results for two different groups would eventually become 
statistically significant if the sample size, and therefore the power [of the test], were to 
increase.”).  Because of various faults in the standard deviation-based approach, this Article 
argues for recognizing the various types of statistical significance, and discriminating between 
these types of significances while attempting to apply statistical methodology for class 
certification.  For example, quantifiable statistical significance should not be viewed as having 
similar inferential strength as those of legal significance.  The power of a statistical test or 
statistical significance to infer pattern or practice discrimination can vary within a spectrum based 
on the number of class representatives analyzed.  If other variables are kept constant, as the size 
of the sample increases (for example, in discrimination cases, an increase in the number of target 
subjects or discriminatory decisions), there will be an accompanied increase in the standard 
deviations or variations.  This would imply that any observed statistical disparities that may be 
recognized as insignificant on a practical or legal basis might escalate to a statistically significant 
level, raising the real possibility of obtaining a statistical result not in harmony with practical 
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the original universe has not been carefully reviewed by plaintiffs prior 
to developing a statistical model. As a result, any attempt in quantifying 
behavioral norms to infer a pattern or practice of discrimination without 
actually quantifying statistical significance becomes an exercise in 
misapplied quantification.80 
This is where the significance of commonality comes into play.  
Commonality within the mass litigation context involves compressing a 
large, unmanageable number of individual trials into a manageable 
single trial.  This requires truncating numerous individual cases to a 
smaller subset in order to retain and exhibit all the major properties of 
the original super set.81  Following the Castaneda/Hazelwood model, 
plaintiffs have historically utilized data sampling to establish the 
presence of a target characteristic within the sample data set at a 
statistically significant level.82 
Clearly, therefore, determining pattern or practice discriminatory 
behavior at a statistically significant level requires a series of 
deterministic steps—including data construction, data measurement, 
and data analysis—all of which depend on a set of characteristics 
inherent within a representative sample of the target universe.  
Statistically significant inferences, therefore, can be impacted by 
various quantifiable factors, including sample size, data stream 
 
expectations (and thereby raising due process concerns).  See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference 
Guide on Multiple Regression, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 191–92 (2d ed. 2000) (noting the relationship between sample selection and 
explanatory power of inference). 
80. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
81. This Article examines the commonality requirement of class certification from a data 
structure perspective in order to examine linkages between statistical sampling and ascribed 
cohesion among disparate class members.  Binding these disparate members for the purpose of 
commonality determination, therefore, requires finding both overriding and overlapping 
characteristics among the putative class members.  In this context, predominance under Rule 
23(b)(3) can be seen as identifying some overriding characteristic where individual reliance may 
be given to uniquely identify a subset of characteristic(s) from a larger subset of common 
characteristics.  That means the overriding element could uniquely distinguish among a set of 
facially similar representatives, when such representation is based on mere possession of common 
characteristics.  For example, suppose plaintiffs attempt to bring a class action lawsuit on the 
premise of contracting an illness from a particular drug.  It is possible that a large number of these 
plaintiffs actually contracted an illness; yet proving causation to the entire universe of plaintiffs 
may be difficult, as exposure to a particular drug may not produce unique illnesses or injuries.  
Thus, we can confront scenarios within aggregate litigation where the existence of common 
characteristics may not necessitate a determination of certification, as the idea of predominance is 
the ideal guidepost in these types of scenarios.  See Klonoff, supra note 15 (manuscript at 69) 
(“[R]egardless of the importance of the common issues, questions of individual reliance are so 
paramount that no common issues can justify certification.”).   
82. See sources cited supra, note 79. 
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uncertainty, and various other quasi-quantifiable characteristics.83  
Quasi-quantifiable characteristics include the impact on significance by 
various actions,84 and scenarios such as data truncation,85 data 
exclusion,86 and data co-linearity.87 In addition, difficulty in 
contextualizing the underlying legal theories of discrimination88 may be 
shaped by the process of evaluating the adequacy of a given sample 
size89 and selecting statistical parameters, such as correlation90 and 
significance level.91 
 
83. By quasi-quantifiable characteristics, I generally mean the problem of segmentation and 
quantification for developing adequate statistical modeling framework to draw inferences in 
complex aggregate litigation.  Segmentation followed by quantification may be necessary when 
qualitative variables must be preprocessed for statistical modeling.  Other times, a particular 
variable may possess value only at intervals, which requires segmentation into appropriate 
quantifiers, for which a statistical regression model is typically developed for identifying 
statistical significance.  Often times, co-linearity is not adequately taken into consideration in 
making decisions based on statistical results.  See Sugrue & Fairley, supra note 71, at 936 n.49 
(“In cases involving continuous or interval variables, such as employee salaries or changes in 
salaries, or scores on tests or rating systems, statistical techniques other than the binomial must be 
used to test whether differences between groups with respect to such variables support an 
inference of discrimination. . . .  Multiple regression analysis permits an estimate of the average 
difference between groups on a continuous variable, like salary, after accounting for differences 
between members of the groups in certain characteristics that are likely to affect that variable, 
such as (with respect to salary) years of experience and years of education.  Multiple regression 
analysis is more complex both conceptually and computationally than a binomial analysis.”).  
84. Id. 
85. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 602–03 
(2012) (examining how data truncation might impact trial outcomes). 
86. See id. at 622–24 (advocating for a calibrated approach in dealing with data exclusion by 
presenting specific examples to show how values can be indexed at the outliers). 
87. Data co-linearity is an issue in multiple regression analysis, which manifests itself in 
significant change in outcomes resulting from small changes in input data.  If data co-linearity 
issues have not been adequately researched prior to the formation of sample size, it may pose 
conceptual difficulty in drawing statistically significant inferences of discrimination. See 
generally Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702 
(1980). 
88. Here I draw attention to the practical difficulty in aligning a particular legal theory with a 
proposed statistical-deterministic process.  The divergence between legal theory and statistical 
modeling may occur for various reasons.  For example, while a particular legal theory underlying 
a case may point to the possibility of multiple outcomes within a spectrum, and thus require 
manipulation of continuous data, applicable statistical modeling, such as the binomial method, 
might provide only binary outcomes.  See DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL 
PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 11–15 (1980). 
89. Selection of sample size impacts the difference between the expected value of a variable 
and observed frequency of such variable.  Selection of sample size in systemic discrimination 
class actions is often a complex and nuanced process that may require selective exclusion of 
members that may not represent the overall characteristics of the target class.  See generally 
SHEIN-CHUNG CHOW ET AL., SAMPLE SIZE CALCULATIONS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH (2d ed. 
2003).  
90. See Fisher, supra note 87, at 712–14. 
91. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 88, at 4–7, 11–13. 
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C. Commonality as a Driver for Statistical-Deterministic Steps 
As the discussion thus far indicates, statistical sampling within the 
context of class action litigation is borne out of the need to establish 
commonality.  In looking at the post-Falcon class action landscape, it 
becomes apparent that Rule 23(a)(2) commonality has become a key 
driver for class certification.92  Thus, it is important to identify the 
appropriate locus of commonality to better understand the relationship 
between commonality and statistical sampling. 
In the context of class action, identifying commonality is the search 
for the invisible glue that binds all scenarios under a microscope.  From 
a due process perspective, commonality must be construed as the search 
for a robust set of characteristics among the class such that those 
common traits can effectively represent all other individual instances 
within the large plaintiff universe.93  For example, if the litigation 
process evolves into a phase where the need may arise to aggregate 
additional class members, the current construction of commonality must 
not foreclose the due process rights of other individuals,94 including the 
defendant and those currently not part of the representative class. 
Overreliance on statistical methodology for drawing inferences in 
pattern or practice discrimination cases is therefore connected to an 
erroneous construction of commonality for class certification.  The 
Dukes example is an appropriate impetus to dissect this current problem 
of statistical methodology in pattern and practice discrimination class 
actions.  At the very outset, the factual elements of Dukes invite a 
number of intriguing questions borne out of the quest for understanding 
the relationship between statistical significance and legal reasoning.95  
 
92. This Article observes that class action jurisprudence post-Falcon has elevated the 
importance of proving commonality for class certification.  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
93. This Article contends that commonality is about identifying the common thread that binds 
the putative members of the class for which certification is being sought.  Therefore, 
identification of commonality must be based on a robust methodology that is capable of 
identifying predominant characteristics of all individual class members within the representative 
set of plaintiffs.  See discussion supra Part II. 
94. Identification of commonality must not be based on selecting a sample in such a way that 
characteristics of such sample may be incapable of encapsulating some characteristics belonging 
to a subset of class members.  Doing so would distort representation of the class and foreclose 
due process rights of the subset identified.  Despite the prevalence of statistical sampling as one 
of the primary determinants of commonality in existing class action litigation, the sampling 
process must go through adequate due diligence to ensure the selected representative truly reflects 
the larger members of the class. 
95. This Article tries to demonstrate that while it is theoretically possible to fashion elegant 
statistical methodologies as objective measures of causation and injury within an aggregated 
framework, applying these methodologies to fact-specific cases and judicial determinations of 
causality, especially when based on extrapolating from a smaller representative sample, may be 
practically difficult.   
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The most difficult proposition faced by the Dukes Court was to 
ascertain how a class as numerous as 1.5 million women could have 
established commonality, especially when viewed in the context of 
Wal-Mart’s decentralized decision making protocol.96  Therefore, the 
facts underlying the claims of discrimination in Dukes compelled the 
plaintiffs to ponder a two-part quandary.  First, how to construct an 
appropriate representative sample satisfying the elements of Rule 23, 
and second, how to adequately design the statistical methodology to 
successfully bridge the conceptual gap between individual and class 
claims (i.e., the conceptual gap between a series of decentralized and 
subjective employment decisions and a statistically significant finding 
of a systemic, corporate-wide discrimination).  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court may have traveled the same path of logical bewilderment.  
The district court in Dukes observed that subjective decision making 
systems affected all plaintiffs in a common manner (especially when 
coupled with Wal-Mart’s centralized corporate culture);97 while the 
Ninth Circuit held that commonality can be established even without 
evidence of a specific discriminatory policy or practice.98  The Supreme 
Court disagreed with these interpretations and took a more restricted 
view of commonality.  According to the Court, the Ninth Circuit’s 
favored construction of commonality based solely on a common 
question of law was simply too broad, noting that commonality based 
only on a common question could easily be the handiwork of crafty 
attorneys.99  By introducing the requirement to seek not only a common 
question, but also a common answer to that question, the Court raised 
the bar for class action litigants.100 But, what drove the Court to 
introduce this new test? 
Commonality is intrinsically linked to sampling efficiency.  The mad 
 
96. Establishing a representative class from a massive population that is scattered in numerous 
aspects—e.g., geographically, racially, and behaviorally—is immensely difficult.  Justice Scalia 
echoed this sentiment in Dukes, noting the complexity in certification: “‘[T]he class 
determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues 
comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.’”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 
2551–52 (2011) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)). 
97. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 166 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
98. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F. 3d 571, 603 (9th Cir. 2010). 
99. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 (“Here respondents wish to sue about literally millions of 
employment decisions at once. Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those 
decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ claims 
for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.”). 
100. Here, Justice Scalia cited favorably to the late Professor Nagareda: “What matters to 
class certification . . . is not the raising of common ‘questions’—even in droves—but, rather the 
capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the 
litigation.  Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to impede the 
generation of common answers.”  Id. at 2551 (quoting Nagareda, supra note 12, at 132).  
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rush to seek settlements for escalated financial resolution has often 
times distorted this linkage, resulting in erroneous statistical sampling 
and prompting faulty class certifications.101  The Court correctly noted 
this disconnect and perhaps bridged a fallacious gap left by years of 
district courts’ liberal interpretation of commonality and certification of 
classes with diverse claimants.  Thus, the Court’s overture in Dukes is 
indeed a rightful course correction—a reminder that fundamental 
notions of due process still play a major role in class action certification.  
D. Using Statistics to Draw Inferences of Discrimination 
This Section explores a set of questions: whether the current 
methodology used for establishing pattern or practice discrimination in 
class action litigation is necessarily a robust one; and whether such a 
test can uphold the substantive and procedural due process aspirations 
of individualized outcomes. 
Employing statistical methodology in class actions to draw an 
inference of pattern or practice discrimination must contend with two 
fundamental issues.  First, the adjudication must clearly understand 
what constitutes statistically significant proof of discrimination.102  In 
other words, the employed methodology must clearly articulate how the 
standard of statistical proof of commonality and significance are linked.  
Second, there must be a theoretical framework behind claimed pattern 
and practice discrimination such that the theory can be either bolstered 
 
101. See supra Part II.B (observing that flawed sampling methodology in identifying a 
representative class may encapsulate erroneous characteristics, thereby failing to adequately 
represent the larger class members).  
102. In 1977, the United States Supreme Court identified two broad categories of 
discriminatory behaviors that are actionable violations under Title VII.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–e-17 
(1976).  Title VII establishes that it is unlawful employment practice for an employer to “fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  Here the 
two broad categories identified by the Court are disparate treatment and disparate impact.  Int’l 
Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).  When an employer treats a 
certain class of individuals less favorably than others because of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin, discriminatory behavior is identified under the actionable violation of disparate 
treatment.  Id.  To prove such discrimination, the Court ushered in a new era of analytic 
methodology via its Castaneda/Hazelwood framework, in which specific statistical model is used 
to calculate two data driven results: (i) an expected view based on a neutral system; and (ii) an 
actual observation.  Based on their difference, the likelihood of finding this actual result as higher 
than the expected result is calculated.  Discrimination is established by proving such difference to 
be statistically significant.  Here, statistical significance of a difference is analyzed within the 
spectrum of a probability of occurrence, such that, if the said difference were the result of a 
neutral system operated under the assumptions of the adopted statistical model, a difference larger 
than it cannot be based on chance alone.  See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 88, at 12–15. 
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or attenuated depending on available statistical data.103  The 
relationship between these two fundamental factors is important on two 
counts. In the absence of a sufficiently robust theory, errors could creep 
into the applied statistical methodology, which could lead to erroneous 
conclusions. Also, despite developing a statistically significant 
modeling technique, the lack of a robust theoretical paradigm for 
discrimination could result in faulty statistical results. Only by 
appropriately constructing commonality can the theoretical framework 
of discrimination be logically linked with the representative sample 
utilized for decision making.  Therefore, identifying and establishing 
commonality is central to class action litigation. 
Typically, class action litigation proceeds after plaintiffs allege that a 
common practice resulted in company-wide discrimination based on a 
protected characteristic.104  Commonality allows for connecting such 
prohibitive practices with all class members.  Here, the objective is to 
incorporate each member of the plaintiff class seeking adjudicatory 
relief into a cohesive and meaningful whole.  The need for procedural 
efficiency requires a proficient way to combine all possible claims for 
which statistical determination based on random sampling has proved to 
be the desired innovative vehicle.  Theoretically, statistical significance 
can determine the outcome for a large number of cases based on the 
relative frequencies of expected behavior and observed behavior of a 
representative sample.105  Despite its theoretical elegance, this sample-
based aggregate determination invites re-examination.106 
 
E. Castaneda/Hazelwood’s Missed Assumptions and Substantive Law’s 
Unfulfilled Aspirations 
Let us revisit the Castaneda/Hazelwood framework. Castaneda 
explored whether a particular Texas county’s method of convening 
grand juries had systematically and unfairly excluded minority 
Mexican-Americans, and therefore whether such method unfairly 
 
103. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 88, at 11–17. 
104. See, e.g., Alix v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 838 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (noting 
that the plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart had systematically deprived hourly workers of wages 
through a variety of unlawful practices, such as falsifying time cards, denying overtime wages, 
and requiring to work “off the clock” without compensation). 
105. See supra Part II.A (observing how selection of sample can shape the statistical 
significance of differences between observed and expected frequencies, which in turn can 
influence whether the court would find the defendant to have discriminated against the class). 
106. See supra Part II.B (observing how lack of nuanced data analysis can introduce data 
distortion within the sampling process, which may impact the fact finder’s determination of 
discrimination). 
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affected the criminal prosecutions of Mexicans-Americans.107  Here, the 
Court compared the percentages of Mexican-Americans in two groups: 
one in the actual county population and the other in the group of persons 
actually summoned to serve on grand juries.108  By finding the 
countywide percentages of Mexican-Americans to be almost twice that 
of the percentage in grand jury participation, the Court found a pattern 
of discrimination against the affected minority group.  By noting the 
difference between the actual and expected number of Mexican-
Americans to have exceeded more than twenty-nine standard deviations, 
the Court ushered in the era of constructing a benchmark based on 
statistical sampling.109 
Hazelwood hinted at a threshold of determination of two or three 
standard deviations to determine the existence of discriminatory hiring 
practices for African-American teachers.110  Perhaps somewhat 
unintended by the Court, the two or three standard deviation benchmark 
has become a standard for the allowable limit of statistical disparity in 
class actions.  Thus, exceeding this standard deviation in a case 
involving expected and actual populations can be the basis for a 
determination of gross disparity.111  Following Hazelwood, lower courts 
began to routinely exercise this technique without adequately 
contextualizing the statistical process with questions of law and without 
investing in procedural rigors to ensure it comports with underlying 
aspirations of substantive law.112  Other times, courts simply accepted 
data without adequately determining its logic and quality.  These errors 
continued to invite substantive due process queries that may have 
eventually been recognized by the Supreme Court in Dukes. 
While the Castaneda/Hazelwood test of two or three standard 
deviations evolved into a norm for class certification analyses, this test 
is certainly not a bright line rule.113  While the use of two or three 
 
107. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 483–84 (1977). 
108. Id. at 487 n.7. 
109. Id. at 496.  
110. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 n.14 (1977). 
111. See, e.g., EEOC v. Am. Nat’l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1191 (4th Cir. 1981) (“The 
conclusion was based upon an apparent assumption that if standard deviations reflected in static 
work force statistics were not ‘more than two or three’ the disparities were necessarily shown to 
be statistically insignificant.”). 
112. See infra notes 114–17 and accompanying text. 
113. See Gay v. Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, Local No. 30, 489 F. Supp. 282, 311 
(N.D. Cal. 1980) (“The Supreme Court, while noting that disparities ‘greater 
than two or three standard deviations’ would be suspect to a social scientist, has never accepted 
that level as sufficient to raise an inference of intent.  In the cases in which it has applied this 
analysis to determine the presence of purposeful discrimination, it has relied on disparities 
ranging from five to 29 standard deviations.” (internal footnote omitted)). 
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standard deviations may serve as prima facie evidence of 
discrimination, judges should be careful to interpret such evidence as 
substantive proof of discrimination.  Given the law of discrimination, 
especially within the context of mass litigation, courts must be cautious 
of the potential deleterious effects of conflation and evaluate statistical 
evidence on a case-by-case basis. 
III. THE MECHANICS OF PROBABILISTIC INFERENCES AND                         
LEGAL REASONING 
To better understand the probabilistic characterization of 
commonality, it is important to dissect the relationship between the two 
or three standard deviation test and its underlying data distribution.  
Conceptually, courts’ understanding of the two or three standard 
deviation test as a bright-line rule comes from the typical assumption in 
social science that data points fall on a bell-shaped curve (i.e., normal 
distribution). This relationship would automatically trigger the 
expectation of having a level of confidence between 90% and 95% 
depending on the desired outcome and particulars of the case.114  An 
outcome of 2.56 standard deviations corresponds to a 95% probability 
of occurrence—that is to say, a 5% level of significance—under the 
rubric of a commonplace social science practice.115 Although the 
Supreme Court has not advanced a rigid rule regarding a sufficient level 
of statistical significance to prove discrimination, lower federal courts 
seem to have established a statistical threshold based on, or near to, a 
95% confidence level.  For instance, the Seventh Circuit outlined in 
Griffin v. Board of Regents of Regency Universities that, 
in addition to describing statistical significance in terms of levels of 
standard deviation, statistical significance also may be expressed as a 
probability value (P) on a continuous or relative scale ranging from 0 
to 1.0.  The level of statistical significance rises as the value of the (P) 
level declines. . . .  A (P) value below .05 is generally considered to be 
statistically significant, i.e., when there is less than a 5% probability 
that the disparity was due to chance.  For large samples, statistical 
 
114. A confidence level of 95% implies a statistical significance level of 5%, which indicates 
that judicially determined judgments will have a disparity of one in five.  If this is applied to a 
typical mass tort adjudication amounting to $1 billion dollars, even a small statistical variation of 
0.5% (a number smaller than 5%) will indicate a possible error of a few million dollars.  See, e.g., 
In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1464, 1466 (D. 
Haw. 1995) (indicating judgment of $766 million with a 95% statistical confidence level based on 
a 137 randomly selected claims), aff’d, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996). 
115. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 88, §§ 9.2–9.4.  See generally MICHAEL O. 
FINKELSTEIN, BASIC CONCEPTS OF PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS IN THE LAW 65 (2009). 
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significance at a level in the range below 0.05 or 0.01 is “essentially 
equivalent” to significance at the 2 or 3 standard deviation level.116 
The Eleventh Circuit echoed a similar sentiment in Peightal v. 
Metropolitan Dade County: “The ‘general rule’ is that the disparity 
must be ‘greater than two or three standard deviations’ before it can be 
inferred that the employer has engaged in illegal discrimination under 
Title VII.  The Court has also called that sort of imbalance a ‘gross 
statistical disparit[y].’”117 
Based on plaintiffs’ statistical expert in Dukes, the observed 
difference in pay between male and female workers was within three 
standard deviations,118 which is a consistent benchmark under the 
Castaneda/Hazelwood test.  Yet, the Court denied class certification.  
This rejection must be viewed within the context of a fundamental 
relationship between sampling and commonality. The majority’s 
reluctance to certify the Dukes class certainly stems from its skepticism 
to use social science methodology without fully connecting it to the 
legal certainty required for due process. In essence, striving for 
efficiency in judicial determination may have allowed class actions to 
carve out a path of least resistance. In the process, procedural 
framework has been sidetracked from the goal of equality and due 
process.119  
A. Commonality Deconstructed through Statistical Significance 
Imagine two distinct scenarios in which a class has alleged workplace 
discrimination.  The first contains an estimated 5,000 class participants, 
for which the calculated benchmark based on a representative sample 
falls at a 2.45 standard deviation.  The second is associated within a 
different industrial segment and contains an estimated 30,000 
 
116. Griffin v. Bd. of Regents of Regency Univs., 795 F.2d 1281, 1291 n.19 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(citing Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 537 n.13 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
117. Peightal v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 940 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1073 (1992).  See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 364–66 (2d Cir. 
1999) (finding that a disparity of two or three standard deviations amounted to a gross statistical 
disparity); Ottaviani v. State Univ. of N.Y. at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 370–74 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(reversing the district court’s ruling on account of erroneous statistical interpretation of plaintiffs’ 
multiple regression analysis), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990); Palmer v. Schultz, 815 F.2d 84, 
96–97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reversing district court findings of nondiscrimination in assignments 
relying on statistical methods); NAACP v. Town of E. Haven, 892 F. Supp. 46, 50–51 (D. Conn. 
1995) (vacating district court’s judgment of discrimination arrived in part by an erroneous 
application of statistics). 
118. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 165 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“[Plaintiffs’ 
statistician determined that [the gender disparity in management] is highly statistically significant 
(47 standard deviations).”). 
119. See infra Part IV (discussing statistical methodology in class action and due process). 
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individuals, for which the similar statistical parameter is a 2.65 standard 
deviation.  How do we treat the equality and dignity requirements 
inherent in due process of law?  Due process requires arriving at like 
outcomes from like scenarios. However, if we were to apply the 
Castaneda/Hazelwood model to these two scenarios, there would be no 
meaningful statistical difference between the two cases.  Since both 
standard deviations fall below 2.75, we would be prompted to conclude 
that the employers in the above scenarios followed neutral, non-
discriminatory practices. 
Without delving into the data level complexities, it must be noted that 
statistical benchmarking would diverge quite fundamentally for such a 
significant difference in the aforementioned sample sizes.  In fact, based 
on the results of these hypotheticals, a finding of discrimination is more 
appropriate for the first scenario than the second.  When the sample size 
of the second outweighs the first by about six-to-one, the threshold for 
statistical significance must be adjusted appropriately.  Thus, it may be 
more probable to draw an inference of discriminatory behavior in the 
first sample size than the second; likewise, it may be more probable to 
draw an inference of a discrimination-neutral environment in the second 
than the first.  It is difficult, however, to rely solely on statistics to 
determine which scenarios are alike and which ones are dissimilar due 
to several structural difficulties within the scenarios’ statistical 
parameters. 
First, how many allegedly injured employees constitute a sufficient 
sample size?  In most modern class actions, the offered representative 
sample is based on controllable factors, including, among others, the 
plaintiffs’ trial strategy, his or her access to certain preferred litigants, 
and how certain target characteristics predominate over others in those 
preferred sample litigants.  From a purely statistical point of view, the 
selected sample should be purely random and exhibit common 
characteristics such that all aspects of binomial design are inherent in 
the sample.  In most circumstances, this aspect of randomness is 
severely compromised.  Here, the lawyer involved may have a specific 
outcome in mind.  He or she can submit a sample for study based on 
that outcome and attempt to shape the judicial outcome in a particular 
direction.  The class action device was designed to promote access to 
justice for all. Yet, this gaming of the class action system is inconsistent 
with the ideals of due process, as it raises questions in these specific 
circumstances as to the defendant’s inability to confront such individual 
plaintiffs. 
Second, descriptive statistics is incapable of addressing the inherent 
granularity of divergences.  An observed statistical parameter cannot 
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recognize patterns with finer granularity while also quantifying 
qualitative variables.  This would imply that a comparison of the two 
standard deviations in the above scenarios might not yield meaningful 
insight towards causes of discrimination or differences in intensities of 
discrimination within the two distinct classes.  If a lower court were to 
apply the guidelines set forth by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits in 
advocating statistical benchmarks,120 it would be hard pressed not to 
deny class certifications in both instances.  Yet, the actual scenarios 
may not be consistent with observed statistical results.  Thus, a variety 
of factors—e.g., significant disparity in sample sizes, lack of equal 
probability thresholds, non-randomness in the representative sample, 
and the scaling effect of sampling—all may contribute to finding an 
inference of discrimination contrary to the facts on the ground. 
Third, a more fundamental question is whether the 
Castaneda/Hazelwood test is still legally justifiable.  Perhaps, Justice 
Scalia’s remark in Dukes is a stark reminder of a new realization 
dawning within the context of pattern and practice discrimination class 
action jurisprudence: 
[W]hether 0.5 percent or 95 percent of the employment decisions at 
Wal-Mart might be determined by stereotyped thinking” is the 
essential question on which respondents’ theory of commonality 
depends.  If [plaintiffs’ expert] admittedly has no answer to that 
question, we can safely disregard what he has to say.  It is worlds 
away from “significant proof” that Wal-Mart “operated under a 
general policy of discrimination.121 
A disconnect between sample-driven statistical evidence and 
plaintiffs’ posited theory of discrimination could cause either legally 
insignificant or statistically indeterminate outcomes.  Yet, the source of 
such indeterminacy or insignificance could vary from fluctuations in 
sampling to data insufficiency.122  Recognition of the need to depart 
from an overreliance on the Castaneda/Hazelwood statistical approach 
would certainly require a multi-step process. First, it must be 
ascertained whether statistical sampling can adequately animate the 
expectation of the underlying legal reasoning.  Second, before analyzing 
the statistical outcome, sampling data must be sanitized to eradicate 
distortionary effects of data that may be either irrelevant or unreliable.  
Only through such nuanced data analysis can one eliminate the ill 
 
120. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. 
121. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
122. See supra Part I.B (tracing the roots of class actions from commonality to statistical 
significance).  
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effects of various data insufficiencies and oversimplifications.  Failing 
to do so would continue to render statistical application suspect.  
The statistician in class action litigation must establish a parametric 
decision making process for establishing statistical benchmarks in order 
to establish acceptable legal conclusions.  Typically, the statistician 
should attempt to establish bounds of legally permissible practice based 
on the outcome of those statistical benchmarks, which in turn should be 
developed based on a prior understanding of neutral behavior.  Here, a 
comparative analysis of the observed frequency in the representative 
sample and expected frequency in population universe based on 
placement of standard variations is used as a guide to draw an inference 
of legally impermissible behavior.123  Often, what is not recognized in 
this conventional statistical journey is that the materiality of observed 
statistical parameters is a function of various qualitative factors.  Absent 
both an appropriate quantification of these qualitative factors and their 
statistical significance, the decision making process may not comport 
with constitutional due process. 
As highlighted in the aforementioned examples, as sample size 
increases the number of legally impermissible discriminatory decisions 
may also increase.124  This phenomenon invites analysis of various 
uncertainties and complexities in the underlying deterministic 
paradigm—for example, how closely these two parameters move, how 
movement of one might influence the other, and how these interrelated 
events might impact their associated statistical outcomes.  
 
123. This Article aims to show that the two or three standard deviation test is neither explicitly 
supported by the Supreme Court in Castaneda nor derived from social science literature.  
Plaintiffs in pattern and practice discrimination class actions typically base their discrimination 
claims on the statistical methodology introduced in Castaneda/Hazelwood.  Seemingly arbitrary 
statistics and a push for judicial economy may preclude participants in the legal process from 
appropriately connecting sample size with statistical significance, which often times result in 
faulty inferences of discrimination.  In this context, standard deviation can be defined as the unit 
of measurement that allows statisticians to measure all types of disparities or divergences with a 
standardized term.  Conceptually, it can be understood as divergence or departure from the 
inherent variability of a data stream.  Courts generally have seen this as “a measure of spread, 
dispersion, or variability of a group of numbers equal to the square root of the variance of that 
group of numbers.”  Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 92 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting BALDUS & 
COLE, supra note 88, at 359).  Often times, courts mistakenly conflate “standard deviation” with 
“standard error” without adequately distinguishing between a sample and a population.  In this 
context, a standard error can be viewed as a “standard deviation equivalent” of a sample.  Or, 
conceptually, it can also be seen as a standard distribution of sample estimators, such as the mean 
around its true value.  See David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, 
in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 174 (2d ed. 2000), 
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman00.pdf/$file/sciman00.pdf (defining 
standard error and noting that authors sometimes use the term interchangeably with standard 
deviation). 
124. See supra Part I.E (revisiting the Castaneda/Hazelwood framework).  
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Understanding these nuances may indeed impact the permissible bounds 
of standards deviation variation.125 
Therefore, prima facie statistical results may not necessarily translate 
into deterministic outcomes for qualitative and complex behavioral 
scenarios.  Each quantifiable variable could be expressed as a function 
of a set of qualitative factors for which there exists neither granularity 
nor segmentation. Thus, observed statistical parameters would be 
incapable of inferring quality conclusions about discriminatory 
practices.126  A perceived statistical parameter might be composed of a 
set of numerical disparities and yet leave the court without any 
discernible way to isolate such disparities in practice.  Depending on the 
specifics of the case, statistically determined outcomes might transform 
from gross discriminatory behavioral patterns to an insignificant or a de 
minimus behavioral spike. 
As one gazes into the prism of the Castaneda/Hazelwood statistical 
framework, one cannot miss seeing diverging colors, depending on 
sample size. Thus, it is possible that the Castaneda/Hazelwood 
traditional disparity yardstick moves within a spectrum from gross 
disparity to negligible disparity, depending on a particular statistician’s 
viewpoint.  Such arbitrariness invites questions regarding whether such 
a process comports with due process.  For example, when would it be 
proper to certify the class in each of the above scenarios?  The question 
raised here illustrates (and emphasizes) the existence of both a 
subjective and a practical dimension in the practice of identifying 
discrimination using statistical methodology. 
An introspective look into the past perhaps illuminates a sobering 
rationale.  The plaintiff classes in Castaneda and Hazelwood consisted 
of relatively small populations.127  Thus, the straightforward statistical 
analysis employed in these cases produced results showing numerical 
disparity that may actually have been borne out of statistical sample 
inadequacy, rather than an outgrowth of systemic discrimination.  Class 
 
125. See supra Part I.E (examining the Castaneda/Hazelwood statistical structure).  
126. Pattern and practice discrimination class action cases depend on the statistical 
significance used in testing.  In essence, such testing identifies from the available data distribution 
a pattern of behavior and draws an inference about such behavior based on the difference between 
expected behavior and observed behavior.  Statistical significance generally indicates the chance 
of an outcome within a range of possible outcomes.  For example, a 95% confidence used in a 
particular test is equivalent to a statistical significance level of 5%, which implies that a judicially 
determined judgment will have a disparity of one in five; whereas a 90% confidence used in a 
particular testing is equivalent to a statistical significance level of 10%, which implies that a 
judicially determined judgment will have a disparity of one in ten. 
127. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 485–87 (1977); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United 
States, 433 U.S. 299, 303 (1977). 
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action cases with significantly larger populations might automatically 
produce large behavioral decisions, inviting numerous issues containing 
even larger non-class members.128  Here, data integrity issues could 
creep in from various sources, including absent class adjustment, 
inclusion of class members that have been neither contacted nor 
consulted, and from class members that have opted out of the litigation.  
Therefore, to develop a statistically significant outcome, a full and 
robust statistical analysis is required a priori, which may only be 
possible by including additional class members that have been kept out 
of the original class.  This process will offer more probative evidence of 
discrimination (or lack thereof).  Next, this Article considers the 
treatment of data sufficiency, data uncertainty, and treatment of outliers, 
while also connecting statistical analysis with substantive due process. 
IV. STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY IN CLASS ACTIONS AND DUE PROCESS 
A. Difficulty, Misuse, and Uncertainty of Extrapolation 
Statistical methodology for class action litigation utilizes both 
sampling129 and extrapolation.130  At its core, a class action is about 
extrapolation—extracting the results from a small subset and applying 
them to a much larger universe.  Fundamentally, this would implicate 
various constitutional rights of litigants on both sides.131  Therefore, the 
difficulty of utilizing statistical methodology in drawing inferences in 
pattern or practice discrimination class actions is not limited to issues of 
sampling or Rule 23(a)(2) commonality.  Three predominant judicial 
concepts deeply ingrained in Anglo-American jurisprudence animate 
 
128. Statistical inference within a class action is based on observing behavior of a subset of 
the larger putative class population, such that the subset is constructed on the assumption that it 
should adequately represent most of behavioral characteristics prevalent in the original.  As the 
size of the population increases, so too does the number of distinct behaviors.  Thus, selecting an 
appropriate representative sample becomes increasingly complex as larger populations introduce 
more diverging characteristics.  Another dimension of complexity in selection comes from a set 
of class members that remain outside the representative class, yet may contain behavioral 
characteristics that predominate over the rest.  Including these members would certainly 
encapsulate a greater number of class characteristics, which in turn would render the selected 
sample more representative of the larger class.  Thus, difficulty in sampling comes from both 
inclusion of representative members and exclusion of non-members, an exercise that is complex 
and subjective, yet highly determinative of the legal outcome.  
129. See Rubinfeld, supra note 79, at 202–03, 205 (discussing different information and 
analytical procedures that aid in resolving disputes over statistical studies). 
130. See infra note 140 (discussing the use of extrapolation in mass tort trials). 
131. Here I generally draw attention to one of the central tenets of this Article—the difficulty 
in utilizing representative samples for inferring decisions to a larger population.  Despite 
procedural safeguards envisioned in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the error in 
judgment occurs as a result of misapplied statistical reasoning in legal decision making. 
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the constitutional arguments within the context of class action litigation: 
(1) the right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments,132 (2) the right to a jury trial under the Seventh 
Amendment,133 and (3) the emerging concept of a right to property.134  
Indeed, these are dynamic rights, whose concepts and usurpation is 
dependent on both context and substance.  The Supreme Court has 
noted that these rights must not be construed as “technical conception[s] 
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,”135 and 
therefore must be balanced against judicial efficiency, litigation savings, 
and harmonization in “litigating identical matters.”136  Yet, rampant use 
of statistical innovations in class action litigation calls for evaluating 
this constitutional rights dynamic.  A simple question perhaps can best 
capture the nature of such inquiry: How does extrapolation via 
statistical sampling and using statistics to draw inferences of 
discrimination impact the due process rights of individual class 
litigants? 
The use of statistics in class actions has been characterized as trial by 
formula,137 identifying gross statistical disparities,138 and bellwether 
trials;139 yet, each of these variants contains similar weaknesses.  First, 
within the context of sampling, extrapolation allows a non-plaintiff to 
enjoy the fruits of adjudication by relying on a representative plaintiff’s 
testimony and construction of causation.140  It does not, however, allow 
 
132. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.  
133. Id. amend. VII.  
134. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Rights and “Rights Talk,” 105 HARV. L. REV. 1106 
(1992) (reviewing MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE (1991)); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).  Property rights as a fundamental right within the Constitution is an 
emerging concept within current discourse—i.e., discourse around the question as to whether a 
certain degree of substantive protection should be accorded to property rights (drawing in part 
from the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and a broader conception of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause). 
135. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)) (describing due process).  See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (discussing the right to a jury trial); Galloway v. United States, 
319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943) (“The more logical conclusion . . . is that the [Seventh] Amendment 
was designed to preserve the basic institution of [a] jury trial.”). 
136. S.W. Airlines Co. v. Tex. Int’l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 94–95 (5th Cir. 1977).  
137. See Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” supra note 85, at 597 (“Sampling and 
other forms of Trial by Formula force adjudicators to give reasons for treating similarly situated 
people who were injured in similar ways differently from one another.”).  
138. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
139. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 557 (2007) 
(describing the origin of, and procedure used in, bellwether trials). 
140. See R. Joseph Barton, Utilizing Statistics and Bellwether Trials in Mass Torts: What do 
the Constitution and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Permit?, 8 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 
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the defendant a reciprocal opportunity to defend against each absent 
class member.141  Further, it does not allow absent class members to 
stake claims for injury dissimilar to the representative plaintiff’s 
claimed injuries.142  Second, finding causation to a claimed injury 
becomes a function of statistical variability that results from various 
factors like quality, quantity, and class members’ characteristics.  Here, 
the due process rights of absent litigants are undermined by chance 
outcomes and vagaries of data management.143 
The current concern over the apparent dismantling of a plaintiff’s 
right to his or her “day in court”144 has grown louder after Dukes, 
driven in part by courts not fully appreciating the impact that inadequate 
statistical inferences may have on the outcomes of class action lawsuits.  
Theoretically, statistical extrapolation based on statistical sampling is an 
efficiency-driven proxy for a conglomeration of individual trials, which 
attempts to find the right locus between two sets of doctrinal tensions: 
(1) liberty versus efficiency145 and (2) liberty versus equality.146  
Originally intended to advance social justice, class action lawsuits 
began as a conflict between liberty and efficiency.147  “Liberty” is 
intended to ensure every individual gets his or her day in court even at 
the cost of limited discovery for defendants,148 while efficiency centers 
 
199, 212 (1999) (“Whether the courts use a class action or consolidation, courts still face the 
possibility of resolving issues unique to individual plaintiffs, particularly the question of 
individual causation.  In the absence of congressional response to the problems, district courts 
have resorted to creative procedures to improve the efficiency of resolving mass torts.  In the last 
two years, two United States Courts of Appeals have approved the extrapolation of the results of 
bellwether trials to non-bellwether plaintiffs.  Although both approaches utilize similar 
underlying principles, the mechanics of the approaches differ.”). 
141. Barton also observed, “The decision by a court to utilize statistics and extrapolate the 
results of a bellwether plaintiff trial to non-bellwether plaintiffs necessarily implicates both due 
process rights and the right to a jury trial for both plaintiffs and defendants.”  Id. at 222.  
Proponents of extrapolation characterize the right affected, at least for defendants, as a property 
right—the ultimate amount of money damages to be paid to the plaintiffs.  The right at stake in 
reality, however, is a procedural due process right either to defend or prosecute the property 
interest.  
142. Id. 
143. See supra Parts I.D–E (discussing the new framework in which statistically significant 
proof is connected with inference and covering the missed assumptions that arose subsequent to 
Castaneda and Hazelwood). 
144. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, at 417.  
145. See supra note 19 (discussing the due process principles of equality and liberty). 
146. See supra note 19 (discussing the primary due process doctrines). 
147. Here I draw attention to the tension between liberty and efficiency.  A strict 
interpretation of liberty would require courts to examine the merits of each injury claim to 
determine class membership and thus clash with the class action’s objective of efficiency.  See 
Mitchell v. Barrios-Paoli, 687 N.Y.S.2d 319, 325 (App. Div. 1999). 
148. Raising the possibility that when a class is constructed for the premised objective of 
judicial economy, scenarios may arise where the defendant(s) may feel unduly penalized in not 
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on the ability to circumvent the excesses in allowing every plaintiff to 
testify.149  “Equality” is enshrined in searching for similar outcomes in 
similar legal scenarios.  Federal class action jurisprudence seems to 
vacillate between these competing paradigms,150 and scholars tend to 
differ in their analysis of this conflict within the context of mass 
litigation.151 
B. Interplay among Liberty, Equality, and Efficiency 
Even if one could envision a system where every class action litigant 
could have his or her day in court, is it practically achievable?  And if it 
is achievable, would each litigant achieve similar outcomes?  Courts can 
bridge disconnect between such ideal conceptions of liberty and 
equality through a framework of efficiency that maximizes participation 
by controlling the adverse impacts of resource constraint.  Some 
scholars—perhaps emboldened by such ideals—espouse that liberty and 
equality are structurally consistent.152  Thus far, courts tend not to agree 
with this viewpoint, especially district courts, which tend to adopt a 
more equality-centric viewpoint and foreclose the path to justice in an 
attempt to preserve equality over liberty.153  Courts at the federal 
appellate level, however, seem to espouse the superiority of individual 
liberty above all else.154  In this context, Supreme Court jurisprudence 
seems to have been shaped by the tension between liberty and 
efficiency.  Perhaps the Dukes Court recognized the need to restrict the 
contours of a rapidly expanding class action landscape that has shifted 
from the liberty versus equality dyad to a liberty versus efficiency dyad. 
On the one hand, the liberty doctrine encapsulates the aspiration of all 
individuals to have his or her voice heard in court.155  In this search for 
 
being able to either individually confront the plaintiff or seek related discovery.  See Am. Pipe & 
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547–49 (1974). 
149. Efficiency may come at the expense of the defendant’s due process rights to confront 
each member of the plaintiff class. 
150. See Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” supra note 85, at 575 (“Although liberty 
dominates the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, an equality principle is emerging at the district 
court level.”). 
151. See id. at 573–76 (discussing the conflict (or lack thereof) between equality and liberty). 
152. See id. at 573–74 (“Liberty and equality are not inherently at odds with one another.  In 
our system of decentralized decision makers, however, a tension between liberty and equality is 
inevitable.”). 
153. Id. at 575. 
154. Id. 
155. A guarantee of procedural due process is enshrined within the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  U.S. CONST. amends. IV & XIV.  In class actions, due process extends to 
safeguarding the rights of plaintiffs, absent class members, and defendants.  Thus, aggregate 
litigation by nature might encounter difficulties in providing due process protections consistent 
with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  This difficulty was brought to surface since the 
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justice, individuals expect a transparent and just framework in which 
individual grievances are adjudicated and duly compensated.156  On the 
other hand, enshrined in the equality doctrine is the expectation that 
similar scenarios culminate in similar outcomes.  As society has grown 
more complex, overburdened courts have started to unravel and the 
need for judicial economy has taken shape.157  Limits on judicial 
resources presented a choice: foreclosing liberty for some,158 or 
 
formative years of class litigation, as illustrated through the judiciary’s struggle in balancing the 
basic due process rights of a litigant with the efficiencies of adjudicating the rights of unnamed 
litigants.  Courts recognized various due process rights of defendants, such as a right to secure a 
determination of certification prior to the determination of merits of the case.  Rose v. City of 
Hayward, 126 Cal. App. 3d 926, 937 (Ct. App. 1981).  See also State ex rel. Union Planters Bank, 
N.A. v. Kendrick, 142 S.W.3d 729, 740 (Mo. 2004) (stating that the court has a duty “to the 
defendants in a class action proceeding to ensure that the litigation will comply with due process 
and achieve a final binding resolution to the dispute”).  In this context, courts in recent years have 
established ways to ensure that the due process rights of absent class members are protected, such 
as examining the characteristics of conflict in question, availability of other alternative means of 
dispute resolution, and the facts affecting procedural fairness.  Yet fundamentally, a defendant in 
a class action may never get the equivalent complement of due process unless the defendant is 
allowed to confront each class member in court, a possibility that goes against the very objective 
of class actions.  See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 182 
n.27 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[Rule 23] constitute[s] a multipart attempt to safeguard the due process 
rights of absentees.”); Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(observing due process implications emanating from adequate notification of potential plaintiffs 
and possible abuse of discretion under the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement).  See also 
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 788 (9th Cir. 1996) (Rymer, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (noting the “transcripts of a selected sample of victims” as establishing 
definitive proof that the extent of injury does not “comport[] with fundamental notions of due 
process”). 
156. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (listing several courts’ holdings in support of 
class action litigants’ due process rights). 
157. The district courts largely supported efficiency over excessive procedural costs to ensure 
iron-clad constitutional guarantees.  For instance, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court noted: 
In striking the appropriate due process balance the final factor to be assessed is the 
public interest.  This includes the administrative burden and other societal costs that 
would be associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an evidentiary 
hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination of disability benefits.  The 
most visible burden would be the incremental cost resulting from the increased number 
of hearings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible recipients pending 
decision.  No one can predict the extent of the increase, but the fact that full benefits 
would continue until after such hearings would assure the exhaustion in most cases of 
this attractive option.  
424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).  The viewpoint that ever-increasing costs should be controlled was 
further advanced by courts during the decade following Mathews, as social science researchers 
corroborated using statistical methodology for legal reasoning in aggregate litigation.  See Saks 
and Blanck, supra note 29, at 827 (noting that “aggregate trials do not violate due process”). 
158. See Barton, supra note 140, at 223 (“Although the defendant may challenge the 
reliability of the particular method of extrapolation by the statistical expert, the defendant has no 
real opportunity to demonstrate the dissimilarity of any particular non-bellwether plaintiff’s 
claims.  Indeed, in Hilao and in Cimino, the only persons who testified were the bellwether 
plaintiffs.  Such limited discovery and consequent presentation at trial hardly affords the 
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innovating a judicial forum in which all grievances by all litigants are 
heard by a judge or jury. 
The search for efficiency in litigation culminated with the modern 
class action.159  Here, the efficiency model attempted to create an 
equivalent of a series of individualized instances within a manageable 
individual trial by integrating the inputs related to all individual 
instances of a particular injury or injuries.  This concept, however, 
implies that the trial outcome must encapsulate the desired outcomes of 
all the particularized individualized processes.  Capturing a series of 
numerous instances within one mechanism is intended to economize the 
civil justice system such that all individuals enjoy the fruits of due 
process.  Here, the implications come in two fronts, procedural160 and 
substantive.161 
C. Sampling, Extrapolation, and Due Process 
The statistically reliant nature of modern class actions—that is, when 
extrapolated results are applied to a larger group of events—implicates 
both substantive and procedural due process.162  This aggregated 
 
defendant the opportunity to defend against the non-bellwether claims.  To require testimony by 
each of the non-bellwether plaintiffs, however, would defeat the whole purpose of extrapolation-
judicial economy.  The use of extrapolation via statistical sampling represents an attempt to 
circumvent the necessity of presenting the entirety of every plaintiff’s case.”). 
159. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical 
Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008) (discussing the creation of the 
modern class action suit). 
160. See supra note 155. 
161. Due process concerns in class action litigation can arise from multiple perspectives: 
conflict with underlying substantive law within the context of a multi-state class actions; conflict 
with an existing federal statute; conflict while attempting to establish a procedural rule, such as 
Rule 23, that may be limited by application in violation of a substantive law; or conflict from 
inherent deficiencies within an underlying substantive law.  The Supreme Court has held that 
“[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).  The Court has also emphasized that a litigant’s “right to litigate 
the issues raised” is “guaranteed . . . by the Due Process Clause . . . .”  United States v. Armour & 
Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971).  This would imply that class defendants have the right “to present 
every available defense.”  Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972).  See Amchem Prods., Inc. 
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997) (explaining that class certification does not mean one 
should “sacrifice[ ] procedural fairness”).  Most recently, the Court noted, “The Due Process 
Clause prohibits a State from punishing an individual without first providing that individual with 
‘an opportunity to present every available defense.’”  Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 
346, 353 (2007) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation omitted).  See Bell v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 580 (2004) (observing that “the trial management plan would 
raise due process issues if it served to restrict [defendant’s] right to present evidence against 
[plaintiffs’] claims”).  Often times, substantive due process is implicated when due process 
precludes class certification, resulting in the defendant being denied the opportunity to raise 
defenses it otherwise would have been able to assert via individual action.  Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 131 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
162. See supra note 59 (discussing extrapolation and due process). 
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mechanism distorts equality in scenarios where like instances may not 
go through similar procedural rigors, and thus, may not culminate in 
like outcomes.163  Although this inconsistency is recognized as 
somewhat of a structural impediment in achieving equality,164 whether 
this also represents an abrogation of due process requires further 
inquiry. 
1. Procedural Due Process in Statistical Sampling 
There is a tendency to conflate the concept of equality with 
procedural due process.165  Procedural due process ensures that each 
individual is allowed an appropriate procedure within the parameters of 
substantive due process.  In other words, procedural due process stands 
for the principle that when the government denies a citizen of life, 
liberty, or property, the person must be given notice and an opportunity 
to be heard.166  Predictably, the Supreme Court has been consistent in 
not recognizing procedural due process as guaranteeing equal outcomes.  
Instead, the Court calls for reframing the characterization to ensure 
availability of conditions to necessitate equal outcomes.167  Thus, 
 
163. Conceptually, aggregating allows individuals with diverging aspirations to experience 
like judicial outcomes, which may not be desirable on two main accounts.  First, from the 
perspective of a plaintiff, there may be differences in perceptions of injury and compensation 
being sought, yet the outcome equalizer in class actions would ensure similar outcomes.  That is, 
the facial equality is fundamentally devoid of consistency and the equality principle is 
compromised by not ensuring similar outcomes based on perceived facts.  Second, from the 
perspective of a defendant, aggregating different plaintiffs into a class does not allow the 
defendant to confront, examine, and challenge relevant evidence from each plaintiff, and thus 
prevents a defendant from asserting individualized defenses for its alleged transgressions. 
164. See cases cited supra, note 161 (listing several courts’ holdings noting the untenable 
position in which the defendants are placed which in turn might implicate their due process 
rights). 
165. See supra note 163. 
166. See generally Sara B. Tosdal, Note, Preserving Dignity in Due Process, 62 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1003 (2011) (discussing federal and California state due process). 
167. The Supreme Court’s observation in Mathews v. Eldridge provided lower courts a 
constitutional framework for charting a newer jurisprudential trajectory.  See 424 U.S. 319, 333 
(1976) (“Resolution of the issue here involving the constitutional sufficiency of administrative 
procedures prior to the initial termination of benefits and pending review, requires consideration 
of three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if any, 
of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest, including the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would entail.”).  The Court 
further attenuated the procedural due process guarantees by qualifying its intentions of not always 
ensuring equality of outcomes from a qualitative standpoint, so long as a basic floor of procedures 
has been maintained.  See id. at 344–45 (“But procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk 
of error inherent in the truth finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare 
exceptions.  The potential value of an evidentiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the 
decision maker, is substantially less in this context than in Goldberg.”).  Procedural due process 
may not necessarily guarantee an iron-clad protection for all litigants.  See Morrissey v. Brewer, 
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procedural due process should be recognized through the necessary 
versus sufficient paradigm, for which there exists no fundamental 
problem in dealing with inconsistent outcomes in mass litigation (so 
long as courts have followed the articulated procedural rules).  
Therefore, the most recent foray of the Supreme Court in Dukes must be 
examined through the prism of substantive due process. 
2. Substantive Due Process in Statistical Sampling 
At the outset, we remind ourselves that procedural due process came 
to life to realize the aims of substantive law.168  Thus, achieving legal 
remedies or rectitude via transformation in procedure is dependent on 
how responsive substantive due process is to the changing dynamics of 
law.  Within the context of class actions, acceptance of probabilistic 
proof and interjection of sampling nuances have been based on group 
typicality,169 while the quantum of proof has been conceptualized as 
part of a floor created to satisfy substantive law.170  To fully appreciate 
these various shades of substantive due process, we need to examine 
complexities in existing doctrinal tensions.  For example, better 
appreciation of a perceived abrogation of equality in class actions 
requires a thorough inquiry of competing tensions between liberty and 
efficiency, liberty and equality, and equality and efficiency.171 
All aggregate litigation types, including mass torts and class actions, 
attempt to create a sample out of a conglomeration of particularized 
situations.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers generally develop a trial strategy with the 
typical goal of identifying the maximum possible number of plaintiffs to 
share a predesigned commonality. This exercise may become 
challenging as changes in absent membership may distort the minimum 
 
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as 
the particular situation demands.”). 
168. In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding the use of 
statistically significant sample as not in violation of the “historical understanding of both 
procedural and substantive due process”). 
169. See supra note 43 (discussing the characteristics of typicality). 
170. Procedural law follows aspirations of substantive law in that procedure is designed to 
ensure basic protective mechanisms for all litigants. 
171. Here I draw attention to the tension between equality and efficiency.  With efficiency 
being the premised goal of class action, the tension emerges when class certification is viewed 
from diverging lenses.  If equality is construed such that like situations must achieve like 
outcomes, then participating class members can surely achieve it within the same trial.  However, 
the issue becomes complicated when the judicial lens from which the dispute is viewed differs in 
its certification analysis.  Therefore, balancing both equality and efficiency as intended goals of 
class certification will turn on how much individualized analysis a class certification process 
requires, which in turn would be influenced by a set of complex factors, such as the nature of the 
claim, difficulty in determining commonality, size of the class, and characteristics of class 
members and their interrelationships. 
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sample required to produce statistically significant outcomes.  The 
construction of a representative sample may inevitably face various 
disturbances, distortions, and attenuations (including those members 
who opt out of the class).172  As the constructed sample may lose 
randomness, the resulting outcome may not represent the desires of all 
class members.  Thus, sampling may provide a judiciously expedient 
procedural efficiency, though there may exist some complexity in its 
construction.  Unless the sample is diligently constructed, the resulting 
outcome may be distorted by data insufficiency.  Given the limited 
resources available for class action adjudication, legal doctrines must 
craft a balance between individuals’ access to courts and the desire to 
achieve like outcomes.  While the balancing must follow a path of 
judicial economy, the economization must not compromise the overall 
quality of the judicial process.  Sampling allows efficiency in the 
process by allowing more litigants to seek justice.  However, such 
efficiency must not lead to a short cut by allowing a distorted sample to 
represent a larger universe of litigants.  Although liberty and equality 
may exist in fundamental forms, their usurpation or temporal evolution 
must be recognized along a spectrum. 
Equality, liberty, and efficiency are the professed due process pillars 
of the civil justice system.  As a subset of this system, class action 
litigation is not expected to use these components in a mutually 
exclusive fashion.  At a minimum, these components must be allowed to 
coexist in a spectrum, where substantive due process can be seen as a 
function of the three principles acting in unison.  Here, the existence of 
absent class members does not necessarily imply that equality has been 
denied to such members.173 Certainly, such scenarios do not 
 
172. The opt-out procedure for certain types of federal class actions may present both fairness 
and due process concerns.  As this Article notes, by distorting the data distribution, opt out can 
potentially shape the sampling process in favor of the plaintiffs, putting defendants at a stiffer 
evidentiary hurdle to overcome without appropriate defenses.  Further, the constitutional 
difficulty with opt out is predominantly based on due process concerns, as seen in the 
reformulation of Rule 23 to prohibit “one-way intervention,” whereby putative class members 
could wait in the wings, watch the class action evolve, and then exercise their option to opt out 
rights, thereby asymmetrically benefitting one party over the other.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3).  
Courts strongly oppose such gaming of the system due to the undue and unfair burden on 
defendants.  See, e.g., Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547–49 (1974) 
(acknowledging rules that limit the potential expansiveness of the plaintiffs’ claims, including 
rules on opting out and notice); In re Veneman, 309 F.3d 789, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Because 
members of a class seeking substantial monetary damages may have divergent interests, due 
process requires that putative class members receive notice and an opportunity to opt out.  By 
contrast, Rule 23(b)(2) imposes no similar requirements.”). 
173. Rather, forming a representative sample following Rule 23 and applying applicable 
statistical significance to draw inferences of systemic discrimination is a complex and 
interdependent process, involving potential legal minefields arising out of the mismatch between 
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automatically lack substantive due process.   
In addition, how can we adequately analyze the full implications of 
absent class members—often times, a set of seemingly uninterested 
individuals who still have vested due process rights?  First, we must 
remind ourselves that due process involves an individual’s ability to be 
subjected to an adjudication process for redress of that individual’s 
claim to an injury or denial of right.  Here, the denial of rights could 
range from restriction to obliteration of certain liberties.174  Redress 
could come in the form of equitable compensation for the alleged injury 
or for undue deprivation of property.  The element that is missing from 
this contemporary analysis is the recognition within the equality 
doctrine that the theme of similar outcomes following similar scenarios 
must not be identified through a particularized connectivity.175  Rather, 
it should be seen within a spectrum. 
Second, due process is not triggered when a party to the litigation 
seeks redress for an injury or injuries.176  Therefore, within the context 
of class actions, there seems to be a narrower interpretation of 
substantive due process.  Expanding the idea will allow substantive due 
process to evolve within the framework of the equality doctrine.  The 
equality in this context comes not by adherence to “like outcomes for 
like scenarios,” but rather as obtaining compensation or redress for 
denial of rights.  Doctrinal evolution must recognize the qualitative 
nature of the redress mechanism rather than comparing the quantum of 
outcomes. 
While the Supreme Court focuses its class actions doctrine 
predominantly from a liberty-centric view,177 district courts have 
traditionally based their jurisprudence on the equality doctrine.178  The 
growth of plaintiffs’ rights within class action jurisprudence is an 
outgrowth of district courts’ reliance on an erroneous one-size-fits-all 
application of the Castaneda/Hazelwood framework.  The Dukes Court 
 
statistics and legal reasoning. 
174. Liberty implications could arise not only if one is denied his or her “day in court,” but 
also from being compelled to a judicial process where one’s expected compensation from injury 
is not consistent with one’s actual injury, or from being forced into inequitable compensation 
predominantly driven by class interests. 
175. “Particularized connectivity” refers to a possible and often tried act of gamesmanship, 
which focuses on a subset of characteristics to shape the representative class, leaving other 
representative characteristics unaccounted for.   
176. Due process must be understood from the relationship between the substantive layer of 
law and the procedural vehicle that animates substantive law’s aspirations.  Thus, absent 
participation, the social justice component is attenuated, thereby affecting due process’s 
fundamental aspirations. 
177. See supra note 19 (discussing the differences between equality and liberty). 
178. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” supra note 85, at 575. 
5_GHOSHRAY.DOCX 12/14/2012  4:16 PM 
2012] Hijacked by Statistics, Rescued by Wal-Mart v. Dukes 507 
simply rectified this tendency.  Participatory ideals are neither fulfilled 
nor maximized when a court misconstrues due process liberty.  Under 
this flawed conception, class action jurisprudence may have been 
viewed through a distorted prism—one that conveys that liberty and 
equality are at odds with each other. 
This Article follows the same logical contour as Dukes, attempting to 
identify why liberty and equality are not at odds.  But something is still 
missing in the liberty versus efficiency and liberty versus equality 
discussions—i.e., a “third dimension.”  This third dimension must be 
conceptualized from an inability to recalibrate the components that 
underlay due process in class action litigation.  By focusing on a 
narrower definition of liberty, equality, and efficiency, existing 
literature has erroneously colored these doctrinal tenants.  Evaluating 
each of these components within a spectrum will therefore allow for a 
prudent introspection in understanding the broader implications of 
recent Supreme Court case law. 
In rejecting class certification, Dukes brought to the surface the 
element of commonality (and rightfully so).179  As highlighted 
throughout this Article, commonality is the most fundamental 
characteristic of class action certification.  In more ways than others, the 
fortunes of litigants on both sides rise and fall with the efficiency and 
robustness in the construction of commonality.  Ultimately, the goal of 
any judicial system is to ensure procedural protection for all its 
participants.  Yet, in allowing more protection for plaintiffs relative to 
the defendants, judges presiding over modern class actions seem to have 
applied procedural protections rather asymmetrically.  What about these 
defendants? What about other plaintiffs like the absent ones?  Clearly, 
Dukes provided the necessary impetus to correct a distorted trajectory. 
CONCLUSION 
The general legal process for class action litigation has been overly 
reliant on statistical methodology.  The use of probabilistic 
methodology in the current aggregate litigation framework, which is 
subject to the vagaries of the statistical determination process, is highly 
susceptible to error.  This Article notes that the inherent conflict 
between how class action litigants collect statistical evidence and 
substantive law’s equality aspiration is too fundamental to ignore.  The 
Supreme Court rightfully corrected this awry course in Dukes. 
Fact finding with mathematical probability invariably comes as two 
 
179. See Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2549–57 (2011) (discussing the legal contours 
of commonality and why the Dukes class failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2)). 
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sides of a coin.  Professor Laurence Tribe has observed that “all factual 
evidence is ultimately statistical, and all legal proof ultimately 
probabilistic.”180  There is great wisdom in this observation.  Courts 
should import complex mathematical tools for facilitating legal decision 
making.181  Yet, doing so comes with the risk of conflating the incurred 
cost of using these tools with the perceived cost savings.  This cost 
savings on judicial adjudication has been the driving force behind 
incorporating statistical evidence in plaintiffs’ class certification 
motions.  That is the seduction aspect.  The peril lies in not recognizing 
what Professor Tribe calls “the avoidable costs” of using a tool “badly” 
or “irrational use[] of [statistical] methods.”182 This Article has 
attempted to inject such awareness, while illuminating the Supreme 
Court’s Dukes opinion through that prism. 
Professor Tribe has also proclaimed that “[m]athematics [is] a 
veritable sorcerer in our computerized society . . . .  [In] assisting the 
trier of fact in the search for truth, [it] must not [be allowed to] cast a 
spell over him.”183  The perceived elegance of statistical methodology 
may have cast a spell over class action litigation while concurrently 
raising serious substantive due process issues.184  Excessive reliance on 
statistical evidence by plaintiffs in class action lawsuits has shaped the 
 
180. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1330 n.2 (1971). 
181. See generally Saby Ghoshray, False Consciousness and Presidential War Power: 
Examining the Shadowy Bends of Constitutional Curvature, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 165 
(2008) (proposing a novel methodology for constitutional interpretation in conceptualizing 
constitutional contours as curvilinear spaces as opposed to linear paths from inquiry to outcome); 
Saby Ghoshray, Applying the Curved Constitutional Space for Legal Reasoning in Cyberspace 
Litigation, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 49 (2007) (advancing argument for a dynamic constitutional 
interpretation of evolving issues in cyberspace law). 
182. See Tribe, supra note 180, at 1331 (discussing the dangers of misusing statistics). 
183. Id. at 1334 (quoting People v. Collins, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 497 (Sup. Ct. 1968)). 
184. Due process must recognize protections for both defendants and plaintiffs, including the 
absent class members.  Erroneous expansion of a class may distort representation by not 
including all pertinent characteristics, which in turn may jeopardize adequate extraction of 
common characteristics for litigation.  Robust encapsulation of common characteristics is 
required for the efficient construction of a representative sample from the available litigants.  As 
commonality is the vehicle to transform the conglomeration of individual circumstances into an 
aggregated whole, inadequate determination of common characteristics could result in either 
inclusion of undeserving class members or exclusion of deserving class members.  A sufficient 
due process mechanism, therefore, calls for constructing an adequate representative class.  In the 
absence of an established procedure for finding common characteristics, commonality is 
determined through a predominance test.  An appropriate predominance test must rely on two 
fundamental assumptions of law.  In the event that a class is too numerous to construct, the goal is 
to design a representative sample encapsulating all possible instances.  Here, a predominance test 
presupposes that sample characteristics are a representative subset of the universal set of 
characteristics such that inclusion of any additional characteristics would not substantively 
change the outcome of the class action litigation.    
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procedural and evidentiary rules of class actions to such an extent that it 
required the Supreme Court’s intervention in Dukes.  To the Court, the 
use of probabilistic methodology in the current aggregate litigation 
framework is susceptible to error.  The inherent conflict between the 
collection methods for statistical evidence and the aspirations of 
substantive law within pattern and practice discrimination was too 
fundamental for the Court to ignore. 
In proposing the course correction in Dukes, the Court tightened the 
evidentiary rules for commonality under Rule 23.  In moving away from 
the long held practice of evaluating common questions to address 
commonality, the Court fashioned procedural rules indexed upon 
evaluating common answers.  This contraction is neither an abrogation 
of rights nor an attempt to impose hurdles on the path toward justice.  
Rather, the Supreme Court acted as referee to correct asymmetric 
influences in class actions.  The elegance of statistical modeling may 
have generated a false sense of precision, while in the process losing the 
substantive concept of due process.  For too long, class certifications 
mushroomed under the simplified methodology, failing to realize that 
interpreting statistics to generate a desired outcome is neither legally 
permissible nor ethically desired. 
The Dukes class potentially contained more than a million 
plaintiffs—an example of a data set with a complex universe.  When 
complexity increases, so too does indeterminacy.  A changing of the 
guard may be required for achieving procedurally robust outcomes.  
Rule 23(a)(2) commonality should not be satisfied by mimicking social 
science’s statistical methodologies.185 The Dukes opinion is a 
substantial step towards reining in the unbridled use of statistics in class 
action litigation. 
 
 
185. Ensuring randomness in constructing a representative sample in class action litigation is 
the most significant objective of constructing a representative sample for the purpose of litigation, 
which some commentators would characterize as the “trial by formula.”  See generally Lahav, 
The Case for “Trial by Formula,” supra note 85.  Despite several variants, trial by formula is the 
search for a representative subset that would embody the characteristics of the larger superset.  
